THE MORAL PHILOSOphie of the *Stoicks*.

Written in French, and *engliſhed for the benefit of them which are ignorant of that tongue.*

By *T. I.* Fellow of New-Colledge in *Oxford.*

Non quæro quod mihi vtile eſt, ſed quod multis.

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TO THE RIGHT HONORABLE SIR *Charles Blunt, Lord Mountioy,* Knight of the moſt noble order of the Garter, Captaine of *Portſmouth*, and one of her Maieſties Lieutenants for the Countie of South.

T. I. *wiſheth increaſe and continuance of honour and vertue.*

IF Chriſtians in theſe daies were as religious in dedicating of their books, as Heathen men in former time were ſuperſtitious in dedicating of their Churches, I doubt not but men would bee as farre

from writing of bookes, as they are from building of Churches. In dedication of their Temples they were (as it is reported) too curious; in dedicating of our bookes we are (as it appeareth) too negligent. They regarded time, place, circumstance and person; we neither respect time, place, circumstance nor person. Indeede the three former doe not much concerne vs at all, but as for the last it should be the first thing which is to bee considered in euery booke: for it sufficeth not that the booke be well written, vnlesse the person to whom it is written bee fitting and agreeable with the booke. For as the Heathens neuer, or seldome times, dedicated their Temples to men touched with the same infirmities that they were, but either vnto the person of some great god

or

or goddeſſe, who might if neede were, be able to defend them: ſo ſhould not wee commit our labours and workes vnto their patronage and protection which are but ſimply men, ſcarce able for to helpe themſelues: but vnto ſuch as either for their vertues ſakes are better then men, as *Ariſtotle* ſaith, or els by reaſon of their places and offices in the Common-wealth, are farre aboue all other men in dignitie, and equall vnto GOD himſelfe (as the Scripture teſtifieth) in name. This reſpectiue care (Right Honorable) hath not ſomwhat, but altogether perſwaded me to offer vp this ſmall booke of *Morall Philoſophie* (which I tranſlated as well vpon iuſt commendations of the author, as alſo vpon intreatie of my kind friend a learned Doctor of Diuinitie) into your

Honors hands: not as if I meant to interprete the ſame vnto your Lordſhip, which better knoweth the French tongue and other languages then my ſelf, or moſt men doe: but for as much as this ſmall booke had great neede of ſome worthie Patron, and none more worthie then your Honor was to be found, whether your rare vertues bee to bee regarded, or the place which you hold with honor in this Common-wealth: it ſeemed good therefore vnto mee to vſe your Lordſhips name aboue all others for patronage of this booke, if it ſhall neede defence, as doubtles it will, though it were neuer ſo well written (as it is moſt excellently compiled in French) ſuch is the priuate malice of certaine euill men, and common deſtinie of al good writers. For who

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is he that will regard a booke if it be little? ſo little doe men conſider the goodnes of things, when they meaſure all things by greatnes: as if *Dauid* were not little when he ſlew *Goliah* the giant; the clowde little which threatned all Iſrael with raine; the oyle little in the pitcher which filled all the emptie veſſels of the widow. And as that oyle was little vntill the time that it was powred foorth: ſo ſmall bookes when they come abroad into mens hands, if they be furniſhed with doctrine, are of great power to conuert men vnto pietie and godlines. The title of this booke is, *The Morall Philoſophie of the Stoicks*. Let it not ſeeme ſtrange vnto vs that Philoſophie ſhould be a meanes to help Diuinitie, or that Chriſtians may profit by the Stoicks. Indeede the licentious looſenes of our times

cannot

cannot well brooke the ſtrictnes of this ſect. The Stoicks are as odious vnto ſome men, as they themſelues are hated of others: they call the profeſſors hereof in their gibing manner ſtockes, and not Stoicks, becauſe of the affinitie of their names. And I pray why may not wee call them wiſards as well as wiſe men by the ſame reaſon? Philoſophie in generall is profitable vnto a Chriſtian man, if it be well and rightly vſed: but no kinde of philoſophie is more profitable and neerer approching vnto Chriſtianitie (as S. *Hierome* ſaith) then the philoſophie of the Stoicks. Let vs then that are Chriſtians follow them as farre foorth as they haue followed the trueth: for truth, as a learned writer ſaith, *Vndecunq, eſt à ſpiritu ſancto eſt:* from whence or whom ſo euer it commeth

commeth commeth from the holie Ghoſt. The Iſraelites when they departed from the Egyptians ſtole away their iewels: wee are permitted to vſe the wordes and ſentences of the Heathen writers to our purpoſe in caſe of doctrine and exhortation, but as it were by ſtealth very warilie and ſparingly, as S. *Paul* vſed for to do. This libertie Maſter *Calum* in his Commentarie vpon thoſe places liberally granteth vs, and I ſuppoſe it cannot lawfully bee denyed: for gold and ſiluer and pretious iewels were euer vſed as ornamēts in the old law to decke and garniſh the Temple withall. As for the wordes of the Apoſtle, which biddeth vs to beware of philoſophie leaſt they beguile vs, they are moſt profitable for our inſtruction, to teach vs not to attribute more

more vnto philoſophie, then philoſophie or the Arts deſerue. *Abraham* was married vnto *Sarah*, *Hagar* was but his handmaid, or at the moſt but his concubine, yet both liued with him in the ſame houſe, and lay with him in the ſame bed. Euery Chriſtian muſt endeuour to be as *Abraham* was married vnto *Sarah*, that is, vnto Diuinitie: for *Sarah* ſignifieth a Ladie and miſtreſſe, and who fitter to be Ladie and miſtreſſe then Diuinitie, which muſt be attended on with Philoſophie, which is in ſtead of *Hagar* her handmaide, which muſt be vſed no otherwiſe then as a concubine or as a ſtranger, as her name in the original betokeneth. If Philoſophie, with her yong ſonne *Iſmael* the Arts, begin to deſpiſe Diuinitie, as *Hagar* deſpiſed *Sarah*, ſhee muſt bee caſt

foorth

fourth to be taught her obedience abroad, which ſhe might as well haue learned at home. But wherefore need all theſe words? why do I goe about to perſwade your Honor vnto the embracing of this kind of Heathen diuinitie, which is better knowne together with the right vſe thereof vnto your godly wiſedome, then my fooliſh ignorãce can informe you? Doth not the temperance of your welgouerned life and ſober diſcipline in manners ſhew that you are a perfect Philoſopher, not in word onely but in deede alſo? There be many which are Stoickes in the ſchooles, as *Arrian* vpon *Epictetus* noteth, but are Epicures at home; that ſpeake well in publike, but liue ill in priuate: your Honor is right well knowne to be none of theſe. For your life in priuate

uate is answerable vnto your life in publike, and your words agreeable with your deeds. And whence proceedeth al this, if a man should search the fountaine of all your actions, but from the fountaine and liuely source of all true learning? which is so vnited and ingrafted into your stocke, that few haue been of your kind, which haue not been either greatly learned, or great louers & embracers of learning: so that learning commeth vnto your Honour, as the Priesthood did vnto the Leuits, by right of succession from the father vnto the sonne. Continue therefore (Right Honorable) continually to cherish the Artes, and loue learning and learned men, as you haue done: and amongst the rest let the worthie work of this noble Gentleman of France, whose name

name is not as yet knowne in England, haue a ſmall roume among your other bookes, till ſuch time as the French copie be to be had, which now is hardly to be gotten: and ſo as there is ioy in your Honors name in this life, ſo ſhall you moſt aſſuredly in the next world, your name being written in the booke of life, haue ioyes without end: which God grant, to whom I leaue your Lordſhip: humbly crauing pardon of the ſame for my boldnes.

Your Honors in dutie euer to command,

TH. IAMES.

To the French Reader.

MEn that are thankfull vnto vs for former benefites, doe binde vs as it were by waie of obligation to followe them with second curteſies: euen God himſelfe which hath no other ſubiect to giue vnto vs but for exerciſing of his bountie, asketh nothing for recompence of all his fauours, but a dutifull and heartie acknowledgement of the ſame. For as he ſeeth we make

account of his fauours, ſo doth he multiplie the ſame vpon vs: What then ought man to do for man, and one citizen for another; ſeeing that he cannot do ſo much good for him, but hee muſt needes owe him a great deale more? Wherfore, ſeeing the Manuell of Epictetus, *which I lately ſent vnto you ſo generally well eſteemed and liked, I haue been encouraged againe the ſecond time to offer vp vnto you this ſmall Treatiſe, which is of the ſame ſtuffe, but a little better laboured. And ſending the whole treatiſe vnto you, I haue thought good to ſend theſe letters of aduertiſement along with it; for feare, leaſt if it chaunce to light into certaine malicious perſons hãds (ſuch as there are too many now adaies in this world) the booke might happen to*

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bee iniuried before it were fullie read or perused. These shall bee therefore to aduertise you, and as many as shall happen to reade this booke, that it is nothing els but the selfe same Mannell of Epictetus owne making, which I haue taken in peeces, and transposed according to that method and order which I haue thought most conuenient; hauing gathered together certaine precepts, sentences, and examples of diuers others, which haue been of the same sect; and bound them vp together in certaine small and short discourses, which I haue thought most fit and proper, to giue light vnto that which was before in their doctrine somewhat darke and obscure: in such sort, that it may serue for the present, in stead of a summarie treatise or short a-

bridgement of all the morall doctrine of the Stoicks. Now I doe not present you their opinions, as if I could warrant them for good: and least of all, so recommending them vnto you, as if vpon the sight and view of them, you should wholly betake your selfe vnto this prophane and puddle water, leauing the cleere and sacred fountaine of Gods word, from whence all holie and wholesome precepts of manners & discipline must be drawne: but onely to let you vnderstand, that they haue been and will be a reproch vnto vs Christians, who being borne and bred in the true light of the Gospel, shal see and perceiue how many there be that haue been louers and earnest embracers of vertue euen amidst the times of darknesse and ignorance. Now

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as concerning this ſmall labour of mine, which hath been employed onely in diſpoſing of the matter, and finding out of words; I preſent it vnto you, as Appelles *and* Policletus *did their tables and Images, with the pencill and caruing knife in my hande, readie to reforme whatſoeuer men of more profound and delicate iudgements ſhall thinke good to be amended: neuer thinking that my labour is throughly ended, till ſuch time as it ſhall pleaſe all them which are accounted men of good iudgemẽt. Peraduenture they ſhall finde in this treatiſe many things worthie to bee corrected, yet notwithſtanding I hope they ſhall haue cauſe to thanke me (if their bringing vp bee not altogether ruſticall and*

vnciuill) for ſtriuing to enrich my natiue tongue with the ſpoyles of ſtraungers, and making the hard and ſharpe thornes of this kind of Philoſophie tractable, and able to bee handled and touched of the moſt daintie and tender hands of my countrimen. And this fauour if I may be ſo happie as to obtaine at their hands, I ſhall not thinke my labour and watchings ill imployed: for I ſhall haue gotten the greateſt honor whereunto my ambitious thoughts may aſpire; which is to be knowne to bee a louer of my countrie, and ſeeker of her good. And being not able otherwiſe (to my great griefe and ſorrow I ſpeake it) to teſtifie my loue vnto her, I comfort her as well as I may in her calamitie, ceaſing not to make my daily

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daily prayers vnto GOD for her good and welfare. God almightie, to whose fatherlie protection I now leaue her, make her as happie and fortunate, as she is honest and wel-meaning.

Du Vair, President
of the Parliament
of Provence.

The Morall Philoſophie of the Stoicks.

THere is nothing in the worlde, which tendeth not to one end or other: yea, euen thinges inſenſible doe aduance themſelues (as it ſeemeth) and make themſelues fit for that vſe, vnto ỹ which they doe properlie belong: and being applied thereunto, doe ſhew forth a kind of ioy, and ſeeme to haue a feeling of the perfection and happines of their eſtates. Things that haue action in them, mooue of them-

themselues in such sort as we see; all creatures in generall, and euery one seuerally in his kinde, with great vehemencie & contention, followeth and pursueth after that, for which they are borne & bred, and doe most certainlie reioyce and exult in the fruition of that which they seeke, when they haue found it out. What then ought man to doe, vpon whom nature, besides this inclination and motion which dead things doe partake with him, hath endued with sence, and ouer and besides sence, which is common to him and other creatures, hath giuen the benefit of discourse and reason, to be able to discerne and chuse the best things of all thinges which present themselues vnto his consideration, and that which is most

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fit and proper to his vſe? May we not ſafely conclude, that man alſo hath his ende, as well as all other creatures; which is ſet before him as the furthermoſt marke and butte, whereto all his actiõs ſhuld be directed: and ſithence that the happines of all things is their perfection, and their perfection the fruition of their end, ſhall not the happines and felicitie of man conſiſt in the ful obtaining and attaining vnto that which is propoſed vnto him, and whereunto all his actions are to bee referred? Now the ende of man and of all his thoughts & meditations is good. And truely, there is not one amongſt many, ſo diuers in nature and condition of life, which deſireth not that which is good, and eſchueth not that which is euill:

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and being demanded wherefore hee doth this or that, answereth not, but that he doth it, or thinkes that he doth it for his good and welfare. And albeit in our actiõs, a man may finde a great manie more bad then good; yet the generall intention, whereby wee are directed and guided, is to come vnto that which is good. But as it fareth manie times with him which aymeth at a marke, if his sight be hindered, either by some disease of the eye, or fault in the ayre, or if hee take one thing for another, although he desire to hit the marke, so that he couet nothing more, yet it is impossible but he should be wide from it: so likewise wee, because we doe not knowe wherein consisteth our good, but oftentimes take that which

which is about it, for it; do therefore in our particular actions take our ayme amisse, and shoot wide from our generall marke and intention.

Good, in good trueth, is not so placed that all the world may see and perceiue it; nature hath sowed and scattered heere beneath amongst vs certaine weake and feeble sparklinges of that heate, which notwithstanding beeing rightly applied vnto our mindes, are able to kindle a pure light in them, and cause vs to see good, as it is, and not as it seemeth. So then, wee must seeke it, and wee shall finde it; hauing found it, we must acknowledge it; acknowledging it, wee cannot choose but loue it; and louing it, wee shall fasten all our desires thereunto, and

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enioy it with great happines. For euen as trueth preſenting it ſelfe vnto our vnderſtanding, is there entertained with great ioy and contentednes: euen ſo good offering it ſelfe vnto our will, is receiued by her with great pleaſure, as being her naturall obiect. And therefore, I thinke, that if a man would properly define good, hee muſt affirme it to bee nothing els, but the eſſence & vſage of a thing, according vnto his nature. For this ſame nature is ſo prudent and prouident a miſtreſſe, that ſhe alwaies diſpoſeth all things vnto their greateſt good, and therefore hath giuen them a firſt motion vnto that which is good, and vnto that ende which they ſhould ſeeke and ſearch after: in ſuch ſort, that he that will followe after it, cannot

cannot chooſe but compaſſe and obtaine it. Now by the rules of nature, man ſhould be ſo compoſed and faſhioned, that that which is moſt excellent in him, ſhould beare rule and commaund, and that reaſon ſhould vſe all that which is preſented vnto her, as beſt beſeemeth her, and ſhal moſt ſerue for her purpoſe.

Well then, the good & happines of man, conſiſteth in the right vſe of reaſon; and what is that but vertue, which is nothing els but a conſtant diſpoſition of will, to followe that which is honeſt and conuenient. There is no man, as I ſuppoſe, but wil auouch this to be good: but yet for all that, there wil bee a great many found out, which will affirme, ẏ herein onely conſiſteth not mans good & happines,

pines, but that hee must haue a sound and well disposed bodie, and a hundred more commodities, without the which it is not possible for mans life to be, much lesse to be happie and fortunate. But if our position which we haue set downe vnto you at the first bee true, (as true it is) that the end of euery thing is his good, and his good is his end, and that these two are so reciprocable and conuertible the one with the other, that the one cannot bee without the other, then may we not iustly say, that health, or riches, are mans good, seeing that they are not his end which he regardeth. For hee cannot possesse or vse them, but to some other end. And so too, that the greatest part of his time, whilest hee enioyeth them,

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he cannot ioy in them, but is with them vnfortunate and vnhappie: vnleſſe peraduenture ſome man will ſaye, that they are happie, which make their riches & health ſerue them (as they doe full many in the world) to nouriſh their vices, and cheriſh them vp in their wicked paſſions and affections. But happily will ſome man ſay, they doe ſerue, as meanes and inſtruments diſpoſed vnto the attainment of this good, without the which it is not poſſible that a man ſhould get it, and therefore by a neceſſarie conſequent they are to be accounted neceſſarie, to the obtayning thereof, and therefore good. Truely it is a harſh and improper kinde of ſpeech, to call that good, which ſerues to the procurement and obtaining of

that which is good; or that which is the ſubiect and matter of good. For vertue, which we haue proued before to be the true good, is of ſuch a nature, that ſhe can make her benefit indifferently of things contrary in nature, ſhe profiteth and helpeth her ſelfe as wel by pouertie as by riches, by ſickneſs as by health. For wee doe as much commend him that can patiently endure his pouertie, and conſtantly beare his griefes or diſeaſe, as we doe him that liberallie beſtoweth his goods, and being in health, honeſtly laboureth in his vocation. So that if you wil needs call riches good, becauſe they ſerue to the obtaining and getting of vertue, why may you not as well call pouertie by the ſame name, ſeeing that it ſerues to the ſelfe

ſelfe ſame vſe, and that more profitablie alſo? Now to call things ſo contrary and repugnant, as riches & pouertie are, by the ſame name, hath not ſo much as any ſhew or apparance of any trueth. Wherefore, let all theſe things remaine indifferent, as being made good or euil, by the mind of man which knoweth how to vſe them rightly, which if he want, yet will he not want the meanes of attayning vnto his ende, which is to be faſhioned and framed rightly according vnto reaſon, and to make vſe and benefit of all things which ſhall happen whatſoeuer, & conſequently to purchaſe his chiefe good and felicitie.

If wee will truly know wherein conſiſteth this good, let vs conſider within our ſelues what that is

which seekes it: for it must needs be the good of that part. Nothing seeks after that which is anothers, vnles it bee coupled and ioyned with his owne. Now then there is no doubt but that the beginning and first motion of all our actions commeth from the vnderstanding and will, and therefore the good which we seeke after, must needs be the perfection, rest and contentment of the same. But if wee place riches and health in this account, and esteeme them for things good, and by a consequent repute all things contrary vnto them euil; what doe we els, but testifie vnto all men, that there is no true felicitie in this world, and that our minds are here held in perpetuall torment? For a man must needes haue death and griefe continuallie

continuallie before his eyes, both which are esteemed euils, and whereof one is oftentimes present with him, the other neuer ceaseth to threaten and menace him. If then they be things euill, the feare of them is iust, & if he be alwaies in feare, how can hee bee at any time happie? Let vs therefore confesse, that either man hath no good ordained and prepared for him in this world, which he may compasse and attaine vnto, or els acknowledge, that this good doth wholly and entirely consist in vertue. For it must needs be that the end of euery thing should be proportionable vnto the strength and nature of the thing it selfe: for otherwise, if the end were vnpossible to be atchieued, in stead of being mans good, it would turne to

be mans further torment. And ſo he ſhould nothing but labour and trauaile in vaine, as the daughters of *Danaus* are ſayd to doe in hell, ſtriuing to fill certaine bottomles veſſels with water, which cã hold no water at all. Againe, if there bee no Science nor Arte in the world, which hath not one end or other limited her, which they may come vnto by keeping of certaine precepts and rules; what ſhall we thinke that nature, the mother of Arts and Sciences, hath propoſed vnto man (which is her chiefe worke) an end, which it is vnpoſſible for him to come vnto, becauſe it is out of his power?

Will (as we ſay) is that which ſeeketh after our good: now a ruled and well gouerned will neuer coueteth (as indeede it ought not

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to doe) but that which ſhe may, and which it is in her power to procure, ſhe buſieth not her ſelfe about hauing of that which it is not in her power to haue when ſhe will; as health, riches, and honors. For if our good did conſiſt and depend of them, wee ſhould not neede to imploy reaſon or will to the procurement of them, but we might as well compaſſe them by prayers & wiſhes: for it is a thing which is ſubiect vnto a thouſand caſualties, which cannot bee preuented or foreſeene, as not being in our hands to diſpoſe of them as we liſt, but ſubiect vnto the rule of Fortune their good Ladie and miſtris. What ſhew or probabilitie of reaſon is there I pray you in this, that Nature ſhould ſo create man, the perfection of all other

creatures, that his good, which is his perfection, should depend not onely vpon other matters, but vpon so many things, that a mã hath no hope to haue them all fauourable vnto him; but that he shuld here beneath with *Tantalus*, lye miserablie thirsting and crying after water. Nay doubtles, Nature doth offer you so much to the getting of this good, as a minde well disposed and fit to vse any thing which shall be layd before it, and to passe ouer those things which doe farre passe his reach and capacitie. Will you then rather choose to runne vnto Fortune, and waite at her deceitfull handes for that good, which you may giue vnto your selfe and if you will? For this is a diuine and inuiolable lawe, which hath been made since the

beginning

beginning of the world, that if we will haue any good, we muſt purchaſe and get it our ſelues, by our owne labour and induſtrie. For nature hath prouided a rich ſtorehouſe of all good things, and incloſed it in our minds: let vs then but ſtretch forth the hands of our will, and we ſhall take as much as we will. For if the will of man bee well guided and ordered, it will turne all things to her good, as *Midas* turned all things that he touched into golde. There is no accident ſo grieuous, which can befall a man either in bodie or riches, whence a man may not reap ſome reſt and comfort of minde: ſo that if we can here reſt & content our ſelues, wee haue alreadie found out our end. For though we ſhould remit ſo much of the ſeue-

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ritie of this sect, as to confesse that the bodie or goods, which are but instruments of mans life, were a part of mans substance, and might by their qualitie alter the qualitie of the soule; yet may wee not auouch this for good, that losse either in goods or bodie, is able to hinder the felicitie and happines of man, if his minde enioy quiet rest and content.

In things which are compounded of many partes, the most noble part giueth both name and lawes vnto the rest, and they take their denominatiō from her: what doubt then can there bee, but that man should bee wholly happie, if his minde enioyeth his happines. And so wee say, that a Commonwealth is happie after a great victorie, although there bee many citizens

tizens loſt, becauſe the happineſſe thereof is meaſured by the perſon of the Prince, or els of the ſtate, to the good and ſeruice of whom all the reſt muſt be obedient. Hence is it that particular men doe euen glorie in their wounds, doe euen bragge and boaſt of them, if they haue receiued them in the defence of either Prince or countrie. Shall we then aſſigne vnto the bodie any other motion or deſire then that, by the which it referreth all things that come vnto him, vnto the ioy and happines of the mind? ſhall we, I ſay, bee ſo fooliſh as to linke and knit the ſoule ſo faſt vnto the bodie, that the good thereof ſhould remaine as a ſlaue within his members, and ſo farre foorth depend on them, that accordingly as the bodie ſhould be well or ill diſpoſed,

disposed, the mind should be altered, and accounted either happie or vnhappie? Truly, if so bee that nature would haue had mans happines and perfection to haue depended on his bodie, or consisted in his goods, she would haue giuē vnto all men like bodies, and like measure and quantitie of goods: for so she should not haue been partiall, but equall vnto all, and so haue passed from the generall vnto euery particular of that kinde. But on the contrary side, she hauing made all men of very diuers natures and conditions, both in respect of their bodies, as also in regarde of their goods, hath notwithstanding graunted vnto all men like power and abilitie of wel vsing their bodies or riches of what sort soeuer they bee, in such sort,

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that the action of the minde may bee as honorable and glorious in one ſort as in another: yea, the excellencie thereof doth appeare & ſhine foorth more gloriouſly, and merit more praiſe then, when being deſtitute of meanes and inſtruments, he commeth of himſelf vnto his wiſhed end. For ſo in my opinion, wee are to iudge him to bee the skilfuller pilot in a ſhippe, which can in a great tempeſt, amidſt the raging flouds, guide an old ſea-beaten ſhip full of holes, whoſe ſayles are rent, and ropes broken; then hee which can tell how to gouerne a new ſhip well rigged and furniſhed with all neceſſaries, hauing winde at wil, and ſeas fauourable. Therefore we will heere conclude this poynt thus: Seeing that the happines of man

doth lye in procuring of his good, and that his good is to liue according vnto nature; and to liue according vnto nature, is not to bee troubled with any passions or perturbations of the minde, but so to behaue himself, happen what happen may, as that he do not exceed patience, or passe the bounds of reason; that if wee will bee truelie happie, we must purge our minds of all manner of passions, & learne how to be affected in minde towards all things which shall happen.

Now there is nothing which can so soone set vs in this way, and learne vs how to obtaine the right course of ordering our affections, mindes and wils according vnto reason, as Wisedome, which is (in my simple opinion) both the beginning

ginning and end of all vertues. For causing vs to haue an exact and true knowledge of the condition and qualitie of things which come into our considerations & viewes, she teacheth and telleth vs what is according vnto nature, and what not, and likewise what is to be desired and followed, or shunned and auoyded. She remoues al false opinions out of our heads which trouble our braines, makes our affections kind and naturall, and finally vpon her waite all other vertues, as being their mother, nurse, and keeper. O how happie would mans life bee, if it were alwayes led and guided by her direction? But alas, as this vertue is most faire and excellent, so she is most rare and hard to be found: for she is so hidden in the bottome of our minds,

mindes, as the veynes of gold lye ſecret in the bowels of the earth, and are found but in few places. This is (as I beleeue) that great, ſtately, and impenetrable buckler which *Vulcan* forged for *Achilles*, wherein were ingrauen heauen & earth, the ſea, clowdes, ſtarres, lightnings, cities, weapons, aſſemblies of people, and combats: and in a word, there was nothing in the world which was not there to bee ſeene: ſignifying vnto vs by that deuice, that wiſedome & the true knowledge of things, doth better preſerue the minde of man from danger, then the buckler or helmet doth keep the bodie from wounds. But as *Achilles* went to ſchoole vnto *Chiron* to learne the vſe of that buckler: ſo we muſt go to ſchoole to Philoſophy, to know

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the right vſe of wiſedoome. And if wee will hearken vnto her, ſhe will tell vs, that wiſedome hath two properties and vſes, the one to prick vs forward to that which is good, the other to pull vs backe from following that which is euil. Now becauſe when we come vnto Philoſophie, we doe not bring with vs a mind pure and neat, but alreadie diſtempered, euilly diſpoſed, and poſſeſſed with filthie humours, and ſuch as are incident vnto the common ſort of people; becauſe, I ſay, wee come vnto her as vnto a skilfull leach or cunning phiſition: therefore if we will bee cured, wee muſt doe as ſurgeons doe which haue to doe with ſores and wounds, who before they apply any medicine or ſalue to cure them, doe firſt draw out all the

bad humours and dead fleſh: and ſo muſt we alſo in like manner begin firſt of all to purge our minds of all ſuch paſsions as doe ariſe in them, and with the ſmoke of them darken and obſcure the eye of reaſon: for otherwiſe precepts of manners and wholeſome inſtructions would profite our ſoules as little, as plentie of meate doth a corrupted bodie, which the more you feede the more you offend.

Now to know what theſe paſſions are, you muſt vnderſtande, that we doe terme them a violent or vehement motion of the ſoule in the ſenſitiue part, which is cauſed in the following or eſchuing of that which ſeemeth to be either good or euill. For albeit there be but one ſoule in euery one of vs, which is the cauſe of life, & fountaine

taine of all our actions, and is all in all, and all in euery part: yet there bee many faculties in the ſoule, which it is ſtraunge to ſee, how diuers, yea how contrarie they be many times one towards another, according vnto the diuerſitie of inſtruments and veſſels where it is kept, and varietie of obiects which are offered vnto her. In one place ſhe cauſeth vegetation, in another motion, in another ſence, in another deſire or appetite, in another imagination, in another remembrance, in another reaſon and diſcourſe: euen as the Sunne, which though he bee all in his owne eſſence, yet diuiding and parting his beames in diuers places, he bringeth heat to one place, and light to another, ſofteneth waxe and hardens clay, ſcattereth

the clowds, and drieth vp ſtanding pooles and lakes. And when the parts where the ſoule lieth incloſed, doe retaine and vſe her but in a proportion of their capacities, and as farre foorth as it is neceſſarie for their conuenient vſe, then ſhe bringeth foorth gentle, ſweet, and orderly effects: but contrariwiſe, if her parts doe take more heate and motion then is requiſite and conuenient, you ſhall haue cleane cõtrary operations, & ſuch as will proue very hurtful and preiudiciall vnto the ſoule: and right ſo for all the world fareth it with the Sunne, who as long as his beames do wander abroad, according vnto their naturall and wonted libertie, doe gently and moderatly heate the earth: but if they be gathered and knit together in the

the hollow of a burning Chriſtall, they doe burne and conſume that, which they were wont before to cheriſh and quicken. Now it hath pleaſed nature to grant vnto ſence this power and ſtrength which commeth from the ſoule, to applie it ſelfe vnto things, and extract their formes, and afterwards either to chooſe or refuſe them, as they ſhall beſt pleaſe or diſpleaſe him, and agree or diſagree with his nature. And this is done for two reaſons: one, becauſe they ſhould be in ſtead of ſentinels vnto the bodie ſtill watching and warding for his good: the other, which is a principall cauſe indeede, becauſe they ſhould bee meſſengers and vantcouriers from the ſoueraigne and chiefeſt part of the ſoule, and alſo ſerue for miniſters and inſtru-

ments of bettering our discourse and reason. But as she hath alotted them this power and authoritie: so she doth most straitly will and command them to cõtent themselues with their office, which is to call to mind things past, & thereupon to aduise themselues what is best to be done: not presuming or daring to disquiet the higher and stronger faculties, or breede any further vprore or confusion. For so it falleth out many times in an armie, that the watch because they know not the purpose of the Generall, whose direction they should follow, may be deceiued, and take the enemie comming vnto them disguised, for friends, and their friends which come in good will to succour and relieue them for enemies: and euen so

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the ſences, becauſe they cannot throughly conceiue and comprehend thinges appertaining vnto reaſon, as being aboue their reach, are beguiled with ſhew and apprarance of thinges, and doe oft times iudge that for a friend vnto vs, which is our greateſt aduerſarie. And ſo whileſt they preſently ruſh forward without ſtaying, or looking for any commandement from reaſon, they prouoke and ſtir vp that part of the ſoule where concupiſcence and anger dooth lodge, whereby ſpringeth ſuch a tumult & hurly burly in the mind, that reaſon during this furie can not bee heard, nor vnderſtanding obeied, no more thē lawes or Magiſtrates are regarded in a ſtate rent and torne with euill diſſention. But in this trouble, the paſ-

sions which doe waxe most mutinous and troublesome vnto the quiet rest of the spirit, doe first arise in the appetible or concupiscible parte, that is to say, in that place where the soule doth exercise this facultie of desiring or reiecting things presented vnto her, as being things proper or contrary vnto her welfare and preseruation. So then, their first moouing and springing is vpon a shew and apparance or imagination of some good or euill. Now if it be of some present good, which she doth alreadie begin to possesse, wee call this motion by the name of pleasure: but if it bee of some good to come, which is as yet farre estranged from vs, we call it desire: if it be of a present euill, the inconuenience and griefe whereof we doe

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alreadie feele, being moued and incenſed againſt another, we call it hatred or horror: and being moued within our ſelues, diſcontentednes, which if it happen vpon occaſion of any thing which concernes vs, we call it ſorrow: if by reaſon of another mans euill, pitie: if by occaſion of an apparant good where wee pretend a part, ielouſie: if otherwiſe, enuie. Againe, to fall backe vnto the ſecond part of our ſecond generall diuiſion: if it be of ſome after enſuing euill, it is rightly termed by the name of feare.

See here the firſt band of theſe ſeditious paſsions, which ſo much trouble the quiet reſt of our ſoule, which are accõpanied with moſt daungerous effects, and yet nothing like ſo daungerous as are

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those which follow after. For why? these first motions being bred and formed in that part, by meanes of the obiect which presents it selfe, doe passe foorth incontinentlie vnto the irascible part of ỹ mind, that is to say, to the place where the soule seekes al meanes possible of obtayning or auoyding that which seemeth vnto her good or euill. And then, foorthwith as a wheele which is alreadie moued, being to receiue a fresh motion is carried about with greater swiftnes: so the minde being mooued with the first apprehension, hauing a second strength added vnto the former, is whirled about with greater violence then before, and stirres vp more strong and vntameable passions, because they are doubled and coupled with the former,

former, and ſo being ioyned toge-ther, doe ſtay and ſtrengthen one another with mutuall helpe and conſent. For the firſt paſſions, which are found of the obiect of ſome imagined or ſeeming good, conſidering with themſelues of the meanes how to obtaine and acquire it, do ſtirre vp in vs either hope or deſpayre: but thoſe affec-tions which are made of the ob-iect of ſome ſeeming euill, doe bring forth feare and anger: which foure paſſions are wonderfullie ſtrong and violent, and doe whol-ly ouerturne the frame of reaſon which they finde alreadie totte-ring.

Heere beholde and marke the foure winds (as I verely ſuppoſe) from whence ſpring the cruell tempeſts of our ſoules. Their den

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from whence they come, is nothing els (as hath been alreadie ſhewed you) but a falſe imagination which wee haue, that thoſe things which are preſented vnto vs are either good or euill. For by this meanes attributing that qualitie vnto them, which indeede is not in them, wee flye or follow after them with vehemencie: and this is the very originall and ſpring of theſe paſſions. Well then to ſtoppe this den, aſſure the reſt of our ſoules, and prouide that they be not otherwiſe moued then it is meete for them to bee, let vs call to minde that which was proued vnto vs in the very beginning and entrance into this diſcourſe. To wit, that the good of a man, and the perfection of his nature, conſiſteth in the diſpoſing and

faſhioning of his will to the right vſe of things according vnto reaſon : and contrariwiſe, that his euill commeth from a diſordered or vnskilfull vſing, or rather abuſing of them. For by the firſt hee ſhall reape much profite, receiue much content and quietnes, and chance what chance, nay he may ſet vp his reſt, and remain as ſtable and immoueable as a rocke in the middeſt of the ſea : by the ſecond, euery ſmall thing that chaunceth will trouble him and turne to his great griefe and diſaduantage. Now this diſpoſition of our will lieth wholly in our power, and conſequently our good and euill. Wherefore, if at any time there be preſented vnto vs any obiect, to the ende that we may not be troubled at all as with ſome good or euill

euill which doth follow vs, let vs conſider whether the thing which happeneth be in our power or no. If it bee in our power well and good, it may bee good or ill vnto vs. And yet in this caſe too, wee muſt not be too paſſionaetly affected in any ſort: for if we can but moderate and guide our willes aright, we ſhall make it good, and ſo continue it ſtill. If it be out of our power, then it is neither good nor euill, and conſequently wee ought not to ſeeke or prouide it.

Now the things which are in our power are theſe; to approue, vndertake, deſire, and eſchue a matter, and in a word, all our actions. For our will hath authoritie and power to rule and gouerne them according vnto reaſon, till they come vnto the place from whence

whence our good and happineſſe muſt come. As for example ſake, ſhe is able to diſpoſe our opinion, ſo that it yeeld not conſent but to that which it is meete it ſhould, and which ſhall bee examined either by ſence or reaſon, that ſhee ſhal cleaue faſt vnto things which are euidently true of themſelues, and keepe her ſelfe in ſuſpence in things doubtfull, and vtterly reiect thinges which are of themſelues plainly vntrue and falſe. Beſides, ſhee can ſo rule our deſire, that it ſhall follow after nothing but that which is agreeable with nature, and eſchue the contrarie. The things which are out of our power are theſe; our riches, reputation, and briefly, that which doth no way depend of our willes: and here, if any thing doe happen, wee may

may not ſay that it is contrarie to our natures: becauſe it happeneth either by the vniuerſall and continuall order of things, and ordinary continuance of cauſes, and therefore ſhould not ſeeme ſtrange vnto vs: or els commeth to paſſe by ſome particular prouidence ſo ordering it, and then we muſt know that nature hath made vs ſubiect thereunto. Furthermore, ſhe hath giuen vs a power and abilitie in the ſoule of well vſing and applying our ſelues to all that which ſhall happen vnto vs from without; which ſheweth that ſhe hath not made vs fit and proper to one thing, but to euery thing which ſhall come vnto vs whatſoeuer: in ſuch ſort that we may not deſire or flie any ſuch externall thing which is not in our power, as well

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for that is a very fooliſh and vaine affection to will that which it is not in our power to haue, as alſo becauſe that howſoeuer it happen, it may proue good vnto vs, and be the ſubiect of many worthie and laudable actions. Now then if we can ſo commaund our ſelues and our minds, as not to deſire or flye any thing which is out of our powers, but with a ſober & moderate affection receiue and entertaine it when it commeth, we ſhall bee altogether exempted from all troubles and perturbations of the minde, wee ſhall bee free and happie, and neuer fruſtrated of our expectations, or hindered in our affayres and enterpriſes: wee ſhall not neede to hate any man, to complaine of any man, to feare any man, or to be angry with

any man: for no man ſhall be able to do vs harme. On the other ſide, if we deſire and labour to auoyde that which is out of our powers, wee ſhall oftentimes fall from our hopes and wiſhed ends, and miſſe of our purpoſes, and light vpon that which wee ſo much abhorre, wee ſhall trouble our ſelues, vexe and torment our ſelues, and all to no purpoſe or end in the world.

There is no man ſo fooliſh or vnaduiſed, but that hee confeſſeth that he had rather haue his deſires then be depriued of them, and rather be free from paſſions, then to be troubled with them, if hee may doe otherwiſe. Is there any man then that will denye this to bee a very good, profitable, and natural rule, by the which he may obtaine any thing which he deſires, if hee

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desire not any thing which he can not obtaine? and by the which we learne not to bee passionate, or ouermuch pensiue for any thing which shal happen, placing good and euill in our power, giuing vs one, and taking away the other from vs when we will? Therefore when any thing doth chance vnto vs, that we may not trouble or vexe our selues, let vs consider foorthwith whether it bee in our power or no: if it bee, let vs so order our will that wee may direct and guide all things vnto their true and naturall vses: and if we do so, we shall bee sure to receiue good thereby: but if vpon inquirie we find them not to be in our power, let vs not bee mooued a whit, but haue this worde alwaies in our mouthes, as a very profitable and

wholeſome inſtruction. This thing toucheth not me at all, it cõcernes not me, that is to ſay, it is neither my good nor my euill, and conſequently neither ſeeke after nor auoyde it: but when it happeneth I wil make the beſt of it that I can, by applying it vnto the beſt vſe I can, and which it is poſſible for me to referre it vnto. And if wee finde our ſelues to be further moued, and ỹ any one of the aforenamed paſſions be ſtirred vp in vs, by apprehending the obiect of things which are out of our power, let vs ſtraight waies weigh and conſider the nature of it which offereth it ſelfe, and wherefore it is ſent vnto vs: thẽ let vs examine our ſelues, to know vnto what paſſion we are moſt inclined, and what effects it bringeth with it: afterwards let vs

marke in our ſelues what vertue is oppoſed againſt it, & what power and abilitie nature hath granted to rule and gouerne it. For as the paſſion commeth from without, and entereth into vs together with the image of the ſubiect, which offereth it ſelfe vnto our view: ſo nature hath fenced vs within with a ſtrong bulwarke or rampire to backe vs againſt the force hereof, that is, hath graunted vs ſufficient ſtrength to reſiſt it, and if that we bee willing thereunto. Therefore the better to fortifie and ſtrengthē this power, let vs furniſh our ſelues with certaine wiſe precepts and ſhort ſentences touching euerie paſſion, wherewith wee may the better bee able to maintaine reaſon, and as it were with the edge of the ſword cut off all ſuch firſt and

ſudden motions of the minde, as may any waies violence it. And to make theſe precepts ſtronger and harder to bee ouercome, let vs ſtuffe them out with braue and worthie examples of men in former time, which haue behaued themſelues right valiantly vpon ſuch or the like occaſions. For the example of vertue in others, engageth vs to bee likewiſe vertuous, and their commendation is a profitable inſtruction for vs to imitate and reſemble them.

Therefore as ſoone as any ſubiect of pleaſure for the bodie, as delicate and daintie meates doe come into our mind, and that we doe finde our ſelues mooued; let vs think thus, that this is one of the things which is not in our power, neither good nor euill; but an in-

different

different thing, a thing which nature hath giuen vs for our ſuſtenance, and being taken moderatly, preſerues the bodie in health, and makes it a fit and able inſtrument for the minde: but contrariwiſe, the exceſſe and ſuperfluitie thereof greatly weakeneth the bodie, and engendreth many grieuous and daungerous diſeaſes, which are the puniſhment which nature vſeth to bridle our intemperance withall. But if once wee looſe the reines vnto our appetites to follow abundance or delicatenes of meate, we ſhall bee held in perpetuall torment and paine, things ſuperfluous will proue but neceſſarie vnto vs, and the minde eſtſoones will become a ſlaue vnto the bodie, and wee ſhall finde that we liue but to eate & drink.

Therefore wee muſt temper this pleaſure with a moderate vſe, and learne to know that it is ſobrietie that doth preſerue the bodie ſound and the mind pure. And therefore let vs frame vnto our ſelues this rule in our diet, to vſe meate for our neceſſitie of foode and maintenance, and let vs not accuſtome our ſelues to delicious fare and daintie meats, leaſt happily being depriued of them our bodies be ill diſpoſed, and our mindes diſcontented: but contrariwiſe, let vs ordinarily vſe our ſelues to groſſer meates, as well for that they make vs more ſtrong and ſound, as alſo for that they are more eaſily to be gotten. For it is an eſpecial fauour of nature, for the which ſhe deſerueth ſingular great thankes at our hands, that ſhe hath made things

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neceſſarie for our life moſt eaſie to be found, & that the things which are not found but with great difficultie, are nothing neceſſarie at all. And truly I cannot chuſe but admire the words of *Epicurus*, but I would they had proceeded out of another mans mouth, becauſe I would not haue ſo worthie a ſentence marred with the effeminatenes of the reſt of his opiniõs: My bodie (quoth he) daunceth for ioy, and my heart within me is rauiſhed with pleaſure, to think that I being content with bread & water, ſhould bee able to contemne all the delicate fare of the world. And now if *Epicurus* gloried ſo much in the contempt of all dainties, what thinke you ſhould the Stoicks doe? ſhould not they reuerence and honour ſobrietie as

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the very foundation of all other vertues, and such a one as stifles all other vices in the cradle, & chokes them in the seede?

We reade that the families of the *Curij* and *Fabricij* in Rome did get many ample victories ouer their enemies, yet were they not renowmed for any thing but for their frugalitie. Their feates of armes did for a certaine time assure the state of the Romanes against their forraine enemies: but their sobernes and frugalitie hath been a law to frame and fashion the mindes and courages of them which did afterwards ouercome all the world: the figges and carrots which they preferred before the riches of the Samnites, were more pleasant in taste to them which succeeded them, then were

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the delicate meates of *Axicius* in his time. Theſe reaſons may likewiſe ſerue vs to moderate thoſe exceeding great pleaſures which wee take in wearing coſtly apparell, and building ſtately houſes, & ſuch other things which are to be referred vnto the vſe of the bodie: for otherwiſe, if we doe not moderate and meaſure the pleaſures which wee conceiue in them by the neceſſitie of nature, the very opinion will draw vs into a perilous downfall, where we ſhal neither finde ſhore nor bottome. For example, firſt our ſhewes muſt be made of veluet, then of cloath of gold, and laſtly they muſt be finely embroydered with pearles and diamonds: and ſo likewiſe our houſes muſt bee firſt built with Marble, then with Iaſper, and finally

nally with Porphyre. It ſhall bee good therefore for vs to obſerue this courſe, that our apparell bee ſufficient to defend vs from the violence of heate and colde, and our houſes ſtrong enough to reſiſt winde and raine, and let vs not ſeeke any thing els: and if happily we finde any thing beſides, let vs not be moued therewith at all.

But it ſeemeth that reaſon hath more adoe in reſiſting the pleaſures which come by ſight, and fruition of fayre and beautifull things, then it hath in conquering the pleaſures which wee haue but earſt entreated of. For wee imagine that the perſon which carrieth on his face the fauours of nature printed in a rare and beautifull ſort, hath a lawfull power ouer vs, and that drawing our eyes

vnto

vnto it, it draweth our affections likewiſe thither, and enthralles thē vnto it euen againſt our willes. But what then? let vs remember that it is a thing meerely without vs, and that it is a grace and fauour which nature hath beſtowed vpō the perſon which enioyeth it, and not vpon vs: and that it is a thing, the vſe and poſſeſſion wherof may be as preiudiciall as profitable vnto vs: and laſt of all, let vs conſider that it is but a floure which continually fadeth, and nothing els but as it were the colour of a bodie. If you ſuffer your ſelfe to bee carried away with this mad and frantike paſſion, where ſhall a man finde you? you cannot bee your owne man any longer; your bodie muſt needes endure a thouſand paynes to ſeeke your pleaſure, and your mind

mind a thousand torments to satisfie your desire. When this desire shall grow to his full height, it wil become low, & loue neuer leaues encreasing till in the end it proue starke madnes.

Let vs therefore prouide our selues of strong rampires and bulwarkes to warde vs against this passion, and let vs take heede that we bee not cosoned or deceiued with her entising baits. The more she dallieth with vs, the more let vs defie her, and let vs take this warning in good time, that she neuer comes to embrace vs, but she meanes to strangle vs: that she neuer giues vs liberty and license, but to bring vs into thraldome and slauerie: she baites vs with honie, to glut vs with gall: she setteth before our eyes a vaine shew

ſhew of pleaſure, which paſſeth away in a moment, and leaues vs ſorrow and griefe which remaineth for euer. Let vs therefore order our mindes in ſuch ſort, that in conſidering the excellencie of beautie, we doe acknowledge the cunning workmanſhip of nature, and let vs ſo eſteeme it as wee doe the Sunne and Moone, for the excellency which is contained within them. And if the law doe grant vs any more particular fruition of it, let it bee taken to that end that nature deſires, and ſo that we doe not loſe the vſe of reaſon which ought ſtill to beare rule in vs; remembring alwaies how much harme commeth by the immoderate vſe of this pleaſure; how it waſteth the bodie, weakeneth the ſoule, and duls the ſpirit. Let vs

altogether

altogether abstaine from it (if it be possible) before wee bee married: for besides that, it wipes away all shame and modestie in youth, it makes them lose the sweetnesse of marriage which they alone doe taste which haue not vsed it before, a sweetnes which souldereth and knitteth together the friendship of marriage: and ouer and besides all these inconueniences before mentioned, it nourisheth vs in the libertie and license of an vnruly and inconstant loue. But aboue all things let vs take heede that wee doe not commit any dishonestie the sooner to accomplish our filthie pleasures. Let vs represent vnto our selues the manifolde dangers which haue befallen thē which haue bin too deeply plunged in them, how some haue lost

their

their goods, others their liues, others their mindes and wits. Againe, let vs on the contrary side consider how much more pleasure it will bee to vs to resist and conquer pleasure, then to possesse it; and how much more praise and commendation of all posterities hath *Alexander* deserued by his continencie, then *Darius* wife and her daughters purchased by their exceeding pleasant & beautifull faces. *Cleopatras* eyes triumphed ouer *Cæsar* and *Anthonie*, but *Augustus* eyes did triumph ouer *Cleopatras*.

Last of all, this kind of pleasure is accompanied with a kinde of delight which concernes the bodie, and in this regarde it seemeth that it is somewhat naturall: but the desire of goods and honours,

and the pleaſure which men take in poſſeſſing of thē, is rooted altogether vpō a bare opiniō. I know not what he was that firſt beguiled vs in giuing of names, in calling that good which doth in no wiſe depend of vs: but this I am ſure that he hath faſtened our happines vnto a rotten cable, and anchored our felicitie vpō the brittle and vnſtable ſand. For what is there in the world ſo vncertaine and vnſure, as the poſſeſſion of ſuch goods as goe and come, ſlide and paſſe away as a torrent? And I may very well ſay as a torrent, for they make a noyſe at their comming vnto a man, are full of violence being poſſeſſed of him, and are indeede nothing els but troubles and griefes: it is long before they come, and when they are

come

come they ſtay not long with vs, but vaniſh away ſuddenly and in a moment, & when they are gone they leaue nothing behinde them in the bottome but dirt and filth.

O riches, if men could bee ſo happie as to ſee the ruſt of cares and griefes which are ingendered in the hearts of men, by looking vpon the brightnes and glorie of your gold and ſiluer, doubtles they would then hate you as much as they doe now loue you. And truly thoſe which do loue you, I can ſay no more of them but this, that they haue one vertue in them, and that is this, to be very conſtant in concealing their griefes, for feare of diſcouering their ſhames: and were it lawfull for ſorrowe freely to vtter her complaints againſt Fortune, think you that ſhe could

not answere the accusation of so many men, as she hath cousoned by giuing of them euils, vnder pretence and title of good things? Verely my opinion is, that shee would haue nothing els to say vnto them for her excuse but this, that she hath bestowed them vpō none but such as did heartely desire them. Let vs then acknowledge riches to be as they are, that is, presents of Fortune, which she doth but lend vnto vs for a while: for goods that ordinarily happen vnto bad men, for goods which are not goods, but whē they haue gotten them good masters: for good which oftentimes corrupt goods manners, but neuer amend the bad: for goods without the which so many wise men haue made their liues most fortunate:

for

for goods which ſo many wicked men hauing had, haue ſuffered moſt pitifull deaths. Let vs know what this vnruly deſire of hauing them doth profit vs. It is a gangrene in our ſoules, which conſumeth our naturall affections with her venemous heate, to fill vs with certaine poyſoned and virulent humours. As ſoone as it is lodged within our hearts, all honeſtie and natural affection which is due vnto parents, friends, & to our ſelues, vaniſheth away: all the reſt being compared with our profits, ſeeme nothing: we, euen we for our profits ſake neglect our ſelues, & deſpiſe our mindes and bodies, and as it is in the prouerbe, ſell the horſe to buy hay. It ſeemes that nature in the very growing of gold, hath in ſome ſort preſaged

their miſeries which ſhould bee earneſt louers of it. For ſhe hath made that in thoſe parts where it groweth nothing proſpereth, neither hearbes, nor plants, nor any thing els which is of any value; as it were foretelling vs that in the ſpirits of thoſe men in whom the deſire of this mettall ſhould rule, there ſhould bee left no ſparkle of honour or vertue.

Let vs therfore chaſe away this furious deſire farre from vs, and leauing the fooliſh opinions of the vulgar ſort of people which poizeth goods in goldſmiths balances, let vs follow the will & counſell of Nature which meaſureth them with the ell of neceſsitie. We ſhall learne of her, that our good cõmeth not from riches, no more then the heate which we feele may be

bee ſayd to come from our garments; but iſſuing from vs is kept & preſerued in them. That which cannot reach ſo farre as them, may be ſayd to be within vs: and ſo our vertue, though Fortune clippe her wings, ſhall not be leſſened thereby: for though it haue leſſe motion, yet ſhal it haue more reſt and contentment. There bee ſome notwithſtanding, which would faine corrupt vs with their vaine and fooliſh opinions, going about to perſwade vs to think vpon nothing els but vpon getting of riches. For what ſay they? If I doe not take care in time to get riches, how ſhall I bee able hereafter to help my friends, or ſerue my countrie? But let vs ſhape them this wiſe anſwere: that it is meete that euery one ſhould ſerue the Com-

monwealth in his seuerall trade and vocation. It is the Philosophers dutie to make his fellow citizens modest and obedient: if he doe so, it may be truly sayd that he hath discharged his dutie, and profited both his friends and country. Besides all this, I would say thus vnto him: set me down any honest course of getting riches, and I wil not refuse to take it: for my part as I doe not greatly desire them, so I would not refuse any honest meanes and paines to get them. Now if you cannot shew me this honest meanes, why are you so instant with me to seeke them by vnlawfull meanes? Let vs learne to seeke that without passiō which nature desires, and we shall finde that Fortune cannot hinder vs from atchieuing our purposes. But

indeed

indeed the ſpeedieſt & trueſt way of attaining vnto riches, is by deſpiſing of riches. If we would faine be rich, we neede not encreaſe the meanes of getting them, but rather diminiſh the deſires of ſeeking them: hee that is a contented man, is a rich man, hee may haue riches when he will. Thus *Bias* made himſelfe rich by forſaking his goods which hee might haue carried with him out of the citie as well as the reſt, (becauſe this was one of the conditions in yeelding vp the towne into the enemies hands) for in ſaying that hee carried all his goods with him, doubtles hee meant his vertues. Thus *Diogenes* grew not onely to bee rich and mightie, but richer and mightier then *Alexander*, when he refuſed his largeſſe, and

in

in recompence of former curteſies asked onely this boone at his hand, that it would pleaſe him to ſtand a little further from him: (for at that time hee ſtood betweene him and the Sunne) and truly as *Alexander* dealt with *Diogenes*: ſo doe they deale with vs which preſent vs with the goods of Fortune: for they doe cleane take from vs the gifts of Nature. And this appeareth moſt manifeſtly in them which ſuffered themſelues to bee allured with the pleaſant baites of honors (as we call them) and to bee toſſed about with the wind of ambition. For forthwith they finde, that in ſtead of light and brightnes they haue nothing left them but ſmoke.

Indeede true honour is the glittering & beaming brightnes of a good

good and vertuous action, which rebounds from our conſciences vnto the ſight of them with whom wee liue, and ſo by a reflexion in our ſelues, brings vs a teſtimonie from others of the good opinion which they haue of vs, which makes vs to enioy great comfort of minde. Now this good dooth wholly depend on vs. Nature procures vs this good, when, and as often as wee will haue it, wee may haue it. But if wee once forſake it, wee doe but embrace a ſhadowe in ſtead of a bodie, and faſten the reſt of our minds vpon the opiniō of the vulgar ſort of people, and ſo voluntarily renounce our liberties, to ſerue the humours and paſſions of other men, and are compelled to diſpleaſe our ſelues to pleaſe them which doe behold vs:

ſo

ſo that our affections are hanged vpon the eyes of other men: and wee loue not vertue, but as the common people doe loue and fauour it: if wee chance to attempt or doe any good thing, it is not done for the loue of good, but for deſire of honour. And ſo wee become like pearced hogges-heads which ſuffer no licour to come foorth, till there bee a vent made. But what bounds hath this paſſion? how is it limited and confined? Doth age waſte it? No. Doe dignities and honours content it? No. It is a gulfe which hath neither ſhore nor bottome. No, no, it is that *vacuum* which the Philoſophers could neuer yet finde, it is a fire which daily increaſeth being daily fed and nouriſhed. They which would ſmooth and flatter

ambition,

ambition, would faine make men beleeue that ſhee is in ſtead of a ſtaire for vertue to mount vp to the top of honour: for, ſay they, for ambition ſake men leaue all other vices, and in fine forſake ambition too for the loue of vertue. But ſtay, this is not true: if ambition couer and hide all other vices, yet ſhe doth not take them away for all that, but ſuffers them to lurke for a time vnder the craftie aſhes of a malicious and fained diſſimulation, hoping that they ſhall haue the opportunitie hereafter to break foorth into a flame, when they ſhal get credit enough to raigne & rage publikely where they will with impunitie.

Serpents loſe not their venome being benummed with cold, neither doe ambitious men forſake their

their vices, whilest they couer thē with the cold of dissimulation: for when it is come to the place whither she desires to goe, then she displayeth her force & makes men feele her strength. And were it so that ambition should abandon all other vices, yet would she neuer leaue her selfe, being onely in this one thing iust, that she sufficeth to her owne punishment, and willingly offereth vp her selfe vnto torment. The motion of her desires is like vnto the wheele of *Ixion*, it is turned vp and downe continually, and neuer suffers a mans minde to rest quietly. Let vs therefore fortifie and stablish our minds against these grieuous motions which so much disease our quiet rest and repose. Let vs so gouerne our affectiōs, that the luster

of

of honours doe not dazle or darken the eyes of reaſon, and let vs plant certaine noble reſolutions in our minds in ſtead of bars and barricadoes againſt the furious aſſaults of ambition. Firſt of all let vs perſwade our ſelues that there is no true honor in the world but that which commeth from vertue. Secondly, that vertue ſeeks no greater or ampler theater to ſhew her ſelfe in, then her owne conſcience. The higher the Sunne is the leſſe ſhadow it makes, and the greater a mans vertue is the leſſe glorie it ſeekes. And indeed a man may very well liken glorie vnto a ſhadowe, for it followes them which flye from it, and flyes them that ſeek after it. Let vs conſider that we come into the world as to a comedie, where wee may

not

not chuſe what part we will play, but onely looke that we play that parte well which is giuen vs in charge. If the Poet bid vs play a kings part, we muſt take care that we doe it well, and ſo if he charge vs with the porter or clowns part, we muſt do it likewiſe: for a man may get as much credit by playing the one wel, as by well acting the other: and like diſcredit redoundeth vnto him if neither bee done well.

As for diſhonours, we muſt vſe them as wee doe meates at a banquet, where wee taſte of them which are ſet before vs, but account it an vnmannerly part to reach our hands after thoſe diſhes which are ſet at the further end of the table, or to take the platters out of the ſtewards hands. And ſo we,

we, if the testimonie of our vertue, profit of our countrie, and fauour of our friends commit any matter of weight and credit to vs for to be done, which we know wee are well able to bring to passe, let vs accept it modestly, and discharge it faithfully and truly, thinking it to be Gods will and pleasure that we should watch and ward, whileſt others take their quiet rest and sleepe. Let not vs seeke any other recompence of our labours, but the conscience of well doing, and let vs rather couet to haue the testimony of our vertues ingrauen in the minds and hearts of our fellow citizens, then on the top of pillers or publike statues: for many times it is a greater honour for a man not to haue that which hee deserueth, then to haue it. I ac-

count it (ſaid *Cato*) more honour to me that men ſhould aske why there were no images erected in honor of me, in this or that place, then if they ſhould aske why theſe images were erected, to what ende, or for what cauſe. To bee ſhort, let vs hold this for a maxime, that the fruit of noble actions is to bee ſayd to haue performed them moſt nobly, and that vertue cannot finde out of her ſelfe any recompence ſufficient to guerdon her ſelfe withall. For without doubt, ambition is a moſt gentle paſsion, which diues moſt gently downe into the moſt gentle manlike and heroical ſpirits: but being there, is not to bee drawne out againe but with great paine. Wee thinke that euery man is bound to ſeeke and follow after good,

and

and amongſt the reſt wee reckon honour to bee one of the chiefeſt, nay more to be accounted of then all the reſt.

See here the cauſe why men ſhould take ſuch pains to ride and runne, to labour and trauell ſo earneſtly and vehemently as they do, and yet for all this, I can aſſure you that the other paſſions which are within vs, which grow in vs by apprehẽſion of the obiect of ſome apparant euill, which wee are to ſhunne and auoyd, doe ſinke deeper into our hearts, and are hardly to be taken out of them. As namely feare, which is an apprehenſion of ſome euill to come, which keepeth vs continually in a bodilie feare, and preuenteth the euils which Fortune threatneth & menaceth vs withall. For certainly it

is one of the cruelleſt inſtruments which opinion hath to torment vs withall: for becauſe ſhe cannot worke vpon vs, but by coſoning and beguiling vs, and that euery man can better ſee things preſent, then foreſee things to come: therfore ſhe ſerues her ſelf with things to come, the ſooner to come to her purpoſes, ſhe lieth lurking in ſome darke or blinde corner, to watch her time and opportunitie, as theeues obſerue the night for their robberies, becauſe ſhe would not be diſcouered in her actions. Afterwards ſhe feares & affrights vs with maskes of euils, which haue but a bare ſhew and apparance of euill, hauing nothing in her which may hurt vs, but the apprehenſion of a conceiued and imaginarie euil, which maketh the

thing

thing ſeeme euill, though it be not ſo indeede, and euen from that which is good draweth a kinde of euill to vexe and trouble vs withall. And good God, how many men may we ſee continually, who for feare of beeing vnfortunate haue become miſerable, and ſo turned their vaine feares into certaine miſeries? How many men are there in the world which haue loſt their friends for feare of diſtruſting them? and how manie haue been ſicke for feare of being ſicke? ſo that it may be truly ſaid, that feare is a heauy weight, which maketh vs ſtoope downe to the ground, and ſtumble as we runne haſtily from that which we thinke is to be auoyded. Therefore let vs take away feare, and we ſhall remoue al danger of euill farre from

vs: at leaſt wee ſhall not feele it before it come, and when it comes it will neuer trouble vs ſo much, that we need greatly to feare it.

If a man might haue his mind to chuſe from what euil he would bee exempted, in mine opinion hee ſhould chooſe to bee freeſt from feare: becauſe the paine of other euils dureth no longer then the cauſe, but feare is formed indifferently as well of that which is, as of that which is not, & which peraduenture is neuer likely to be; yea of ỳ which cannot be at all. O what a craftie and ſubtill paſſion is this, which can out of an imagined euill draw foorth ſuch a true and liuely griefe? Thus he inueigled the painter *Parrhaſius*, to torment ſome of his ſeruants, that he might the better bee able to imitate

tate and expreſſe the lamentable and ſorrowfull paſſions of the fabulous *Prometheus*. Now tell me why ſhould we be ſo ambitious in ſeeking our owne harmes, as once to runne to meete and preuent them with our thoughts and meditations? Nay rather on Gods name, let vs ſtay til they come, but neuer make any great looking after them, and it may bee they will not come ſo farre as to vs. There bee a thouſand lets and hinderances (which cannot bee foreſeene) to ward the blow from vs, which we feare is comming vpon vs. For euen our feares are as eaſily beguiled as are our hopes. But alas, what is there to bee feared? Feare we that which is in our power or no? No: for then perhaps wee might remedie it. What then? is

it a thing out of our power? If it be ſo, it is no euill, and what cauſe then haue wee to feare it? Wherefore ſerues this feare then? Mary it ſerues for a voluntarie puniſhment to vexe our ſelues withall. On the contrary ſide, if wee can but beare a braue minde and reſolute courage agaynſt this paſſion, we ſhall bee well able to remedie and redreſſe many things which happen vnto vs, which by feare and aſtoniſhment are made farre worſe then they are: but amongſt many other euill effects which feare bringeth with it, this is one moſt dangerous, that ordinarily it maketh a mã to hate that which he feares.

Now hatred is a moſt deadlie paſſion, which troubleth vs very ſtrangely. For I pray, ſtay a while

and

and conſider with your ſelues how when wee meane to hate a thing indeed, this affection of hatred is nouriſhed and increaſed within vs, though it bee neither watered nor laboured, and finally how it cauſeth in vs an vtter loathing and deteſtation of that which is hated. And what is that which we doe ſo greatly hate and abhorre? Mary that you may bee ſure which wee ſhould not: for if there bee any thing in the world which deſerues to be hated, it is hatred it ſelfe, and ſuch like paſſions which are contrarie to the nature of that which ſhould commaund in vs. This is the onely griefe in the worlde to vexe vs withall. We hate the perſons themſelues, and we hate their actions, either becauſe wee feare ſome euill to come, or remember

ſome

some euill past which we haue receiued by them, or els because the nature of our sences hath a kinde of contrarietie, antipathie, or contrepasion with the thing hated. And is there any thing that can trouble vs more then this? By this passion wee bring our selues into the power of that which we hate, to vexe and trouble vs as it listeth. First sight moues sence, then remembrance wakeneth the spirit, and so whether we be waking or sleeping, wee represent the thing hated vnto our selues, with a kind of despite and gnashing of teeth, which brings vs cleane out of order, carrieth vs out of our selues, & rents our hearts in peeces most pitifully. Whereby it so commeth to passe, that the paine of that euil which we doe wish vnto another man,

man, doth fal vpō our own heads. Wherefore let vs ſhut the gate of our ſoule againſt this great & terrible paſſion: and to take away all pretence of entring in vpon vs, by a miſlike and lothing of thinges which may come into our imaginatiō, let vs propoūd to our ſelues this rule which is moſt true and infallible, to wit, that euery thing hath two handles, by the which a man may take and lift it vp: if we take it by one of the handles it wil ſeeme heauie and grieuous: if by the other, wee ſhall finde it light and eaſie to be borne. Now nature may ſpeake vnto vs, as the Philoſopher did vnto his ſchollers; that which I offer vnto you with the right hand, you take with the left, you alwaies chooſe the worſt; if there be any good thing

you

you leaue it, and if there bee any bad thing that you will bee ſure to take. For example, there is one of your neighbours which ſueth you in the law, and therefore you can not thinke on him, but you muſt dreame of his proceſſe, and conſequently curſe and blame him therfore. See here the bad handle, for take him by the other handle, and then ſtraight waies you will thinke that he is a man as well as you, & that God hath bound you to loue him by a likenes of nature, that he is your fellow citizen, and that you are ioyned together in a communitie of the ſame lawes, the ſame Churches, the ſame Altars, and the ſelfe ſame ſacrifices: againe, that you are fellow neighbours, bound by charitie to ſuccour and relieue one another, and

ſhall

ſhall not ſo many ſubiects of good will bee able to quench one little ſparke of hatred? Peraduenture you haue a brother which hath offended you, and if you chaunce to meditate on him, you thinke and meditate on him that hath offended you, and not on him which was cõceiued in the ſame wombe, that ſucked the ſame breaſts, was brought vp in the ſame houſe, and laſtly that hee is the one halfe of you. Let vs learne then to handle things rightly, to take them by the good handle, and ſo we ſhall find that there is ſomewhat or other to be loued in that which is now hated of vs. For certainly there is nothing in the worlde which is not created for mans good. If there be any vicious thing in it which wee do hate, it is the euill of the vicious

perſon

person himselfe, and not ours. If happily hee offend vs, wee haue more cause to pitie and lament his case, then to hate and abhorre him. For he himself is the first that is offended, and receiueth most harme therby: for by this meanes he commeth to lose the vse of reason, and what greater harme can there happen vnto a man in this world? Wherefore in such & the like cases, let vs turne our hatred into pitie, and studie to make thē worthie of our loues which wee would so faine hate. Thus dealt *Licurgus* when euery one forsook the companie of a certaine fellow which had thrust out one of his eyes, hee abandoned not his companie, but carried him home with him, gently entreated him, and enioyned him no other punish-

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ment but this, that he ſhould ſtudie more earneſtly to bee ſoberly and vertuouſly brought vp: which being done, hee returned him to his fellowe citizens, which found that whereas he before was a very quarrellous and iniurious fellow, now he was become a good, honeſt, and ſober citizen.

And looke as we ought to ſhun hatred, ſo likewiſe muſt we auoyd enuie: for they are ſiſters germaine of the ſame colour, and the ſame port, and both of them haue effects equally daungerous. Enuie ſtirreth vp within vs a kind of ſorrow at the good which other men enioy, which ſtill lieth gnawing at our hearts, and tormenteth vs moſt cruelly. Indeede it is a cruel paſſion, and ſo cruell, that all the torments of the moſt cunning and

and exquiſite and profeſſed tyrants in the worlde, could neuer haue found out a greater. For ſeeing it is of power to conuert and turne another mans good into her harme, what limits can there bee preſcribed vnto her torments, when both her owne euils and other mens goods ſhal ioyne together to torment and trouble her? Let vs therefore runne away from her as wee would doe from ſome wilde beaſt, which neuer ceaſeth to deuoure and gnaw our hearts, and ſeeke vtterly to depriue vs of any good that ſhall happen vnto vs. Whileſt the enuious man looketh wiſtly and ouerthwartly ouer another mans good, he letteth his owne be ſpoyled, and ſo loſeth the pleaſure thereof. Now the readie way to take away the feare of this

enuie,

enuie, will be to ponder and consider with our ſelues what is that which wee eſteeme good, and enuie another man the hauing: and we ſhal find, that all being put together, yet there is nothing which wee would willinglie haue our ſelues. For I finde that the things which commonly we enuie other men the hauing, are theſe: riches, honours, and fauours: but if a man ſhould ſpeake thus vnto vs, I am content that you ſhould haue as much as they at the ſame rate, I warrant you wee would ſtraight waies anſwer that we would haue none of them. For if wee would haue them as they haue them, wee muſt flatter and coſen as they do, ſuffer many iniuries, and needes loſe our libertie. For as the world goeth now, there is nothing to be

gotten for bare nothing. Perhaps you make profeſſion of honor and vertue: wel this cannot be bought but with the loſſe of other things which are gotten by a modeſt and ſhamefaſt kinde of patience. Riches, dignities and fauours are beſtowed on them onely which can tell how to ſooth men vp in their humours, and apply themſelues vnto their pleaſures and affectiõs. This is a law, or at leaſtwiſe the cuſtome of the world, and it was a cuſtome before euer you were borne, and therefore why doth it grieue you to ſee it obſerued? This man ſels his libertie and freedome to receiue the price of an office or dignitie: why do you enuie thereat, for I am ſure you would not ſel yours to gain as much: you would faine haue ſiluer and cloath and

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ſuch like thinges which this man exchaungeth for his libertie, and yet you would keepe yours: but you may not doe ſo, the law of nations is againſt it, either you muſt be content with your ware, or els with the price. I goe to the market, and there I ſee one open his purſe and deliuer out a peny, and bee carrieth away with him a lettiſe, or ſome ſuch thing: I which giue nothing carry nothing home with me, and yet I thinke my ſelfe as good a man as he euery day of the weeke. For lee here is all the difference, he hath his lettiſe, and I haue my mony. I eſpie my neighbour comming from a feaſt; when I conſider onely the good cheare which hath been made him, I ſhall be ſorrie that I was not there with him: but when I think how a man

must flatter the master of ỹ house, if he will be welcome, I had rather neuer haue good cheare, then at any time to neglect the dutie of an honest man. Let vs therefore, as we tender our rest and quietnes in this world, take heede that wee grow not too enuious of another mans good. For if it be a true good which hath happened vnto him, we should rather reioyce and bee glad with him for it: for euery mā should desire the good one of an other; and to reioyce at the good of another is the way to encrease a mans owne.

The very same rules are to bee obserued concerning ielousie: for it is as like it in nature and effect as may bee; vnles this bee the difference, that in respect of enuie wee consider not good, but when it is come

come vnto another man which wee desire to haue our selues: but iealousie is of our owne proper good, when wee feare least another man should haue part with vs. But verely it is a sottish and irksome passiõ, it is the gall which maketh bitter the honey-sweet of our life: for it is ordinarily seene in our pleasantest & sweetest actions which it maketh so bitter and sharpe, as nothing can bee more: for it chaungeth loue into hatred, respect into disdaine, and certaintie into distrust. Make this account with your selfe, that whosoeuer meanes to leade a ielous life, must leade a miserable life. The onely meanes of shunning and auoyding it, is to make a man worthie of that which is desired: for iealousie is nothing els but a distrust

of a mans selfe, and a bearing witnes of himselfe against himselfe of his small deseruings. In my opinion, it was a very worthie answer which the Emperour *Aurelius* made vnto *Faustine*, whē she asked him what hee would doe if *Cassius* happened to get the victorie ouer him. Mary (quoth hee) I hope I doe not serue the gods so ill, as that they will suffer this misfortune to light vpon me. Let thē which feare to lose the part which they haue in other mens affectiōs say in like sort, I haue made more account of his friendship, then to deserue any such thing at his hāds, as to bee lawfully disfriended of him.

The presumption and confidence of our owne worthines, is a great pledge to assure vs of ano-

ther mans goodwill: for hee that seeketh a thing with a vertuous intent, is glad to haue a companion ioyned with him in the pursuite thereof: for he may serue to prouoke his dulnes, and succour his weaknes and imbecillitie, in pursuing of that which is good, because of the shining glorie & honour of the others estate. Onely weaknes feares to be encountred, because she is afraid, y being compared with another, she shall by and by shew foorth her imperfection. Who is he that would if hee might sport himselfe alone at the games of Olympus? Take away emulation, and take away glorie, and take away the very spurre of vertue. It is a straunge thing, that accordingly as we are disposed to vse and receiue the things which

happen vnto other men, so they serue vs either to a good vse or to a bad vse: for marke, if the good of another man doe not breed ielousie within vs, and keep vs in a continuall feare and perplexitie. Againe on the other side, how another mans euill doth cause a kinde of remorse and pitie: so that what for the one and what for the other, wee are cleane transported out of our selues, and doe come to our wits ends. And whether it bee because of a secret consent within vs, whereby we do communicate with one anothers miseries, or whether it be for that we feare lest that should happen vnto vs, which hath chanced vnto our friends, we sigh and groane, suffer and endure with them in their miseries. And we are not greatly to bee blamed

for

for so doing: prouided that it bee done moderatly and so farre forth, as that it may serue as a meanes to waken and stirre vs vp to help and succour them. For this is commanded by the law of humanitie: but we are not bid to adopt vnto our selues their griefes, or to darken the cleerenes of our mindes with the smoake of their miseries.

Now the necessarie remedies which we must be prouided of, against the discontentednes which wee take by another mans euill, called pitie, are common to that other kind of discontent which is called by y name of griefe, which is the feeling of some pretended euill in our selues. For as soone as these euils (for so wee call them) doe assault vs, foorthwith the strength of our soules withereth away,

away, vnlesse wee take the better heede, and wee are drawne headlong into a kinde of languor, womanishnes and want of courage, that it is strange to see, which taketh from vs the vse of reason, and meanes of prouiding for our own affayres. In this case it shall bee good for vs to remember what things are in our power, and what not, & to esteeme that euill which is contrarie vnto the perfect disposition of our will. For by this meanes wee shal come to know, that grief and pleasure are drawne both of them out of the same well, if a man haue but the skill to turne his bucket when he would fill him with either: for the vse is all in a thing, and euery thing is as it is vsed good or bad. Thus wee make riches become euill, when wee

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make them ſerue in ſtead of meanes to execute our euill paſſions: and contrariwiſe, pouertie proueth good vnto vs, if we accompanie it with frugalitie and patience: thus reſt and quietnes increaſeth our miſerie, if it increaſe our ſloth and ſluggiſhnes; and labour and paine ſeemeth ſweete, when by our labour and induſtrie in ſeruing our countrie, we purchaſe honour and credite. Wherefore, let vs ſo take and eſteeme of euery thing, as it is to be taken and eſteemed of, and we ſhal finde that there is nothing but will yeeld vs ſome commoditie or other. For there is no chance in the world which can happen ſo croſſely, but nature hath prouided a habit and diſpoſition in vs to receiue it when it cõmeth, & turne it to our ioy and contentment.

Therefore

Therefore when any thing doth vse to trouble vs, let vs consider two things: the one, the nature of that which hath chaunced vnto vs: the other, the nature of that which is in vs: and then let vs learne to vse euery thing according vnto his nature, and so wee shall be sure neuer to receiue any lothing or discontentment at all. For discontent being a disease of the soule is contrarie vnto nature, and therefore we may not suffer it to take deep roote within vs. Now there is nothing that causeth more offence or discontentment, then the newnes or straungenes of a thing when it happeneth. And this appeareth most euidently, in that the things which displease vs most are made pleasant and sweete by custome and continuance. The

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gally ſlaues when they goe to ſea, weepe at firſt ſhipping, but after three or foure moneths they ſing as merrily as birds. So that you ſee cuſtome is al: for they which haue not been accuſtomed to the ſea, are afraid and looke pale when they ſee them weigh anchors and lanch foorth into the ſea, though it be in a calme: where contrarily the old and tried marriners laugh and are merrie in a tempeſt. And looke what good cuſtome bringeth vnto the common ſort of people, the ſame meditation bringeth vnto a Philoſopher: for by often thinking and meditating vpon things, hee maketh them ſeeme moſt familiar and ordinarie vnto him. Let vs therefore exactly conſider & ruminate with our ſelues, the nature of each thing that may

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molest and trouble vs, and let vs cast before hand the worst that maye happen; as sickneſſe, pouertie, baniſhment and iniuries, and let them ſift them narrowly to finde out the nature of them, or els that which is moſt contrarie vnto their natures. It ſo falleth out that ſome of vs are diſeaſed in bodie: well, it is not wee that are offended but our bodies: for the offence being taken, many times hindereth the excellencie and perfection of the thing: whereas otherwiſe the diſeaſe may happen to bee a great deale fitter ſubiect and occaſion to exercile our patience with praiſe and commendation then health: now where there is moſt occaſion of praiſe, is there leaſt good to be gotten?

As much as the mind is more

to

to be accoũted of then the body; ſo much the goods of the minde are more to bee valued and eſteemed of then the goods of the bodie. If then the bodie be the inſtrument of the minde, who will be ſo fooliſh as to complaine, whē hee ſeeth the inſtrument applyed vnto that vſe for the which it is ordained? A mans bodie is ſick and diſeaſed: no great maruel, for ſeeing it is a compound thing, therefore it is ſubiect vnto alteration. Yea ſir, it is true, as you ſay: but yet for all that the griefe of the diſeaſe is felt ſo violently, that it makes vs cry out in ſpight of our teeth. I grant indeed that it is felt, I muſt needes confeſſe that, but it is felt onely in bodie, and it makes vs crie too and if we wil be ſo fooliſh. Griefe is not intollerable, but vnto

vnto them which thinke that it is so: for there bee which can indure and suffer it when it is at the sharpest. *Posidonius* the Philosopher discoursing at large of certaine matters in the presence of *Pompey*, was sorely troubled with the gowt, and whē the disease pained him most, hee sayd no more but this: Sir griefe, you haue attempted your worst against mee, what remedie but patience: you thinke to make mee curse and speake ill of you: no, no, farre be it from me that euer I should say that you are euill: and so hee went forwarde with his discourse, and made as if he had neuer felt it. Now I pray tell me and if you can, what new remedies had this Philosopher found out against this griefe? what plaisters and oyntments had hee

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ſtored vp againſt the gowt? Truly theſe two, the knowledge of things, and courage of minde. For he was thorowly reſolued, that the body was made to ſerue the ſoule, and that if ſo be the ſoule ſhould be grieued for that which happened vnto the bodie, that then it muſt of force bee ſubiect to the bodie. Now if it ought not to bee troubled for that which happeneth vnto the bodie, how much leſſe ought ſhe to bee grieued for the loſſe of goods? For the loſſe of a mans goods dooth not touch a man ſo neere as the want of his health. Indeed both of them are things meerely without vs, yet of the two the bodie is neerer vnto vs then goods.

Man commeth naked into the world, and ſhall goe naked out of

the world, can hee then truelie ſay that any thing is his, which he neither brought hither with him, neither may carrie away with him when he departeth? The goods of the earth are like vnto houſehold ſtuffe in an Inne, which a man need not care for but as long as he lodgeth in it. Yea, perhaps will ſome man ſay, but if I haue them not, I may happen to dye for hunger. Well, if this bee all the care that may trouble your minde, follow mine aduiſe and you ſhall do well enough: you were better dye for hunger in a good minde, then to liue richly and fare daintily being in continuall griefe and torment. You muſt make this account, that the loſſes which you ſuffer, are the priſes wherwith you purchaſe quiet reſt and content

of

of mind. If you employ them to ſome vſe, why then they are not loſt: if you doe not employ them, then you loſe both your goods and your mindes both together. Would you therefore faine know an eaſie way to cure you of theſe wounds? I will ſhew you it preſently; look vpon the skarres and wounds which other men of good account & great reſolution haue receiued: and conſider how they haue laught at ſuch loſſes, and taken occaſion to thanke God for them. Hearken what *Zeno* ſayd, that at that time when he ſuffered ſhipwracke, the windes blew very luckely: for they brought him vnto the hauen of Philoſophie, where he beſtowed the remainder of his life in a moſt quiet and peaceable Sun-ſhine, amidſt the tempeſts of

ciuill diſcorde, and had a ſafe couert to defend him from a thouſand ſcorching griefs, which trouble and torment men in the affayres of this world.

Doe you know how to ſuffer loſſe of things ſo that it ſhall not trouble you? It is quickly learned, there is no more in it but this, not to accuſtome your ſelfe to loue any thing otherwiſe then it is, or better then it deſerueth. If a man haue an earthē veſſell, let him loue it as a veſſell of earth, which may bee broken, and ſo if it chance to be broken, the matter will neuer trouble him much. Let vs paſſe from ſmaller thinges to greater things, from vile and baſer things to things of greater value & more account, and let vs doe the like. If wee loue our children, let vs loue

them

them as men, that is to say, as men subiect vnto infinit casualties of death, and then afterwards when they happen to dye, their deaths will be neither straunge nor grieuous vnto vs.

Indeed it is an imagination and opinion that vexeth and tormenteth vs more then the things themselues, which is formed of those words which a man vseth when he is surprised with such accidēts: for we call one thing by the name of another, and imagine it to bee like vnto that other, & the image and Idea thereof remaineth so in our mindes. And therefore let vs mollifie and sweeten our words as well as we can: for if one of our children chaunce to dye, say not I haue lost one of my children: but this, I haue restored one of my

children to God, of whom I borrowed them. And likewise if wee lose any other of our goods, let vs vse the like wordes. If a naughtie fellow take away our goods from vs, and it grieues vs at the verie heart, say no more but this: Was it not meet that God should haue that againe which he had lent me for a time? For the rest, remember your own opinion of the like mishaps when they did happen vnto others, and consider with your self how thē you were not much moued, but rather how you did blame them, and neglect their friuolous and vaine complaints. Suppose that the iudgement which you giue of them, is a preiudice against your selfe which cannot be auoyded. For our iudgements in another mans behalf are alwaies more

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iuſt and fauourable, thē in a mans owne cauſe. If a ſeruant of your neighbours chaunce to breake a glaſſe, you ſay, there is no great harme done, it was but a glaſſe broken. If his ſonne dye, you ſay, he was of eſtate mortall, not borne to liue euer: and I pray why can you not ſay as much when your owne ſonne dyeth, without crying out, tormenting your ſelfe, or accuſing God and men for the loſſe of that which is ſo ordinarie? There happeneth nothing vnto you but that which you haue foreſeene and thought on a thouſand times: and wherfore then are you ſo much aſtoniſhed? For verely I am perſwaded, that if wee were as prouident and careful as we ought to be, and may be if we will, wee ſhall little neede to bee afraide or

troubled when any thing happeneth, and principally wee ſhould not greatly care for that which we call iniurie. For let vs but ſet before the eyes of our mindes the manners and humours of men, with whom we doe conuerſe, (as they are for the moſt part) and we ſhall bee quickly reſolued, I warrant you, to ſuffer many lewd parts at their hands, and to indure much of their indiſcretion: for the common nature of men is to reioyce in euil doing, and to meaſure their authorities by nothing but by the iniuries and contempts of other men. So few there be that take pleaſure in well doing.

Let vs therefore determine with our ſelues, that on what ſide ſoeuer wee turne our ſelues, wee ſhall finde ſome or other that will bee

readie to offend vs, ſo that a man may finde, as many men ſo many iniuries. But let vs take heed that we be not ſurpriſed by them, ſtanding alwaies vpon our garde, and hauing due regarde vnto them when they come. So that whither ſo euer wee goe, and what buſines ſo euer we vndertake, let vs conſider before hand what the euent is likely for to be, and how we ſhall be entreated. If we bee deſirous to goe to the baths, let vs wiſely caſt with our ſelues before hand what the actions of men are when wee ſhall come thither, how one gapples and cryes, another iuſtles and iumbles his fellow, here one daſhing them with water, and there another readie to ſteale their garments. If wee haue well premeditated and forethought vpon all this,

this, wee shall doe nothing but laugh at matters when they happen. If we haue occasion to visite some great man, let vs imagine that hee will make vs waite at his gate, and when we seeke to get in at the doore, the porter will shut vs out, and clap the doore against vs; that we shall finde him busie, or in such a case that hee will not bee spoken withall, or when all is done that he wil not giue vs good countenance, and scarse bid vs welcome. When we haue debated all this with our selues, little cause shall we haue to be moued or troubled.

Besides all this, there is another thing which serueth greatly to sweeten our iniuries, and that is whē we excuse them in our selues which haue offered vs any iniurie,

rie, presuming that they would not haue done it without some occasion. For example, if you should call to your seruant, and he not answere you againe, thinke that hee did not heare you when you called him, he hath not been there whither you sent him, suppose that hee was not at leisure to goe thither: and thus let vs doe in other matters, framing still excuses vnto our selues in the behalfe of other men: but especially in matters of iniuries, let vs serue our selues with the commodity which they offer vs. For as there is no kinde of hearbe how venemous so euer it bee, which being well tempered and ordered to the purpose, hath not some profitable vse in it selfe: so is it in case of iniuries. We may (to speake with the least)

least) reape two commodities by them: the one, that they make vs know them which offer vs iniuries, to learne to take heede of thē against another time: the other, in that they discouer our weakenes and infirmitie, and the place which lyeth so open to the batterie, that we may be the better able to fortifie and strengthen it. In such sort that if you chance to see a man which speakes ill of you, conclude by and by with your self; doubtles this man is an euil man, I may not trust him at any hand. Thē examine whether that which he saith be true, either in whole or in part, and correct that fault in your selfe, least happily another man take occasion to speake as much, or more of you. For I pray you, what better reuenge can a man

man take of his enemies, then to profit by their iniuries? But indeede the laſt fence and ſtrongeſt rampier that we can haue againſt theſe or the like accidents is this, to be reſolued that we cannot receiue any harme but of our ſelues; and that if ſo be our reaſon be ſo well gouerned as it ought to bee, we cannot be wounded at al. And therefore wee may crye out with *Socrates*; *Anitus* and *Melitus* may put me to death, but they can not doe me any harme.

Now he that is prepared to ſuffer the iniuries & rebukes of men, will not bee to ſeeke to beare the paine of baniſhment. For commonly it is allotted vnto honeſt and good men, by the iniurious dealings of the wicked. But becauſe it is but a vaine ſhew of e-

uill,

uill, wherewith opinion terrifieth our minds, and vseth to draw forth the bitternes of griefe and sorrow; let vs therefore consider it more particularly, and try whether it be as grieuous vnto a man when he stands by it and viewes it more exactly, as it seemeth vnto him when he is a farre of. Who hath taught vs that it is the nature of man to stay still in the same place? What greater displeasure cā there come vnto a man then to bee confined & limitted within certaine boūds? Looke vpon all the cities of the world, and obserue the inhabitāts there dwelling, to see how many you can find which were townes-borne children, bred and brought vp in the same place; & I beleeue you shall finde, that the greatest part of the inhabitants are voluntarie

tarie exiles frō their natiue countrie. Euery place in the world is a wiſe mans countrie, or rather no place at all is his countrie. For his habitation is in heauen, whither hee aſpireth after hee hath paſſed the time here beneath of his ſorrowfull pilgrimage ; making his abode in cities and prouinces, as trauailers do in Innes and oſtelries. Againe, we cannot ſee paſt ten or twelue leagues of ground : but the face of this great heauen gliſtering with ſo many faire and beautifull ſtarres, doth ſhew her ſelfe once a day, becauſe we ſhuld ſee her turne round about when ſhe diſplaieth her beautie to the full. Wherefore then ſhould it grieue vs ſo much to loſe the ſight of ỹ place where we were borne? It was in ỹ power of our mothers

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(and if they listed) to haue been brought a bed in other places, and so to haue made vs changed our countries.

This is a barre against all that may be obiected concerning this matter, that we were borne either here or there, it matters not where, and therefore we need not sorrow so much at our banishments. *Pompey* seeing the effeminatenes of the Romanes mindes which were with him at the battaile of *Pharsalia*, and perceiuing how they turned their eyes & thoughts towards the citie of Rome, sorrowfully regreeting their houses, and sighing as mē banished from their countrie: My friends (quoth he) the countrie where good men dwell in, is their libertie. *Rutilius* declared this most manifestly vn-

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to *Sylla*: for being by him ſent for back againe from baniſhment, he would not repayre vnto Rome, but rather endure the vaſties of a deſert and ſolitude of an Iland, rather then to abide the face of the tyrant in his owne citie. Euery country is fit to nouriſh and bring vp men, euery countrie yeeldeth them parents: for nature hath ioyned al of vs together in bloud and charitie: euery countrie bringeth foorth friends vnto vertue, for vertue is of power to make men loue one another. What then is there which may cauſe vs to grieue at our departure from the place of our naturall abode? for the ſame heauen hangs ſtill on our heads, and the ſelfe ſame elements continue: If we loſe not our courages, we ſhall not loſe any thing by our

baniſhments. Now if you can reſolue vpō that which I haue propounded vnto you, to auoyd theſe firſt paſſions well and good, I ſhal not neede to employ any further time to diſcourſe vnto you the way and means of preparing your ſelfe againſt the other. For if you neuer receiue into your minde thoſe paſſions which grow in the concupiſcible part of the ſoule, you ſhall neuer be vexed with thē which are formed in the iraſcible part. For as much as theſe, which are deſpayre, and hope, feare, and choler neuer riſe and ſtirre in our minds, but after deſire & loathing are ingendred within vs. And as the former (whereof we haue hetherto ſpoken) grow by an application of the obiect and opinion conceiued, that they wil be fauourable

rable or contrarie vnto vs: ſo theſe other ſpring from a conſideration and ſearch of the ſoule which it hath to obtaine or auoyde that which ſhe deſireth or flyeth. This is but as it were a mouing of the ſoule out of it ſelfe, which is cauſed by a redoubling of the former paſſion, and therefore as a fire better kindled they are hard to bee quenched: for in a moment they gain the greateſt part of the ſoule, and ſhake her ſtrongeſt paſſions. Now for a remedie to garde vs from them, let vs learne to call them all by their ſeuerall names, and knowe them by the liueries which they weare, made of certain terrible and grieuous accidents.

For the firſt, which is hope, kindling our fooliſh deſires with a ſoft and pleaſant winde, cauſeth a cer-

taine fire in our hearts full of a thicke ſmoke which dazels our vnderſtanding, carrieth our cogitations away with violence, and holdeth them hanging in the clowdes, vtterly depriueth vs of iudgement, and maketh vs to dreame waking. And as long as our hopes dure, we cannot be perſwaded to forſake our deſires. On the contrary part, when deſpayre is once lodged within vs, it ſo tormenteth our ſoule with an opinió of our diſabilitie in obtaining of that which wee deſire, that euerie thing muſt yeeld vnto her becke, and giue her place: ſo that for the very loue of that which wee imagine we ſhall neuer be able to attaine vnto, we forgo the quiet reſt which wee alreadie enioy. This paſſion is like vnto little children,

which

which for ſpight that one of their toyes ſhould be taken away from thē, throw al ỹ reſt in the fire. This paſſion is angrie with her ſelfe, and of her ſelfe exacteth the paine of her misfortune. The meanes to cure a man of it, is to arreſt his deſires at their firſt peeping forth, and if they bee wicked not to permit them to goe any further, and if they bee good to temper and make them goe and grow into a ſweete and peaceable affection, without looking afterwards for any more fauour, then the nature of the thing and inconſtancie of Fortune doth ſuffer and permit: ſtill ballancing our hopes and feares together. For a wiſe man ought not to liue in hope more then in feare; and it is not his part to cō-mit himſelfe into Fortunes hands,

to hinder or diminish any thing from his pleasures. In like manner he should not despayre or doubt of any thing, as well for that his desires should be bounded within the limits of his power, as also for that such is the vnsteadfastnes of things, that it doth as well relieue things desperate, as altogether ouerturne and quaile the hopes of things wished for.

Now for feare, which is a violent trouble, whereby the soule being frighted retireth backe into her selfe, and there stayeth because she seeth not the meanes of auoyding the danger which is imminent ouer her head, it is a dangerous passion: for besides the great discouragement which it bringeth vnto vs, it seaseth vs with such a kind of astonishment, that

we

wee haue no meanes of diſcourſe left vnto vs: yea euen at that time when our ſences are moſt quickeſt. For then our eyes are opened and yet wee can ſee nothing, men ſpeake and talke vnto vs, but wee heare them not, and when wee would runne away from the danger, wee haue not the power ſo much as to liſt vp our legs. To ſay the trueth, it commeth vnto vs at the firſt by a diſpoſition of nature, but afterwards delicate nouriture and fonde education, preuaileth much vnto the increaſing of it. For becauſe we were not nouriſhed and brought vp in the time of our youth vnto labour and paine, therefore wee begin to feare thoſe things which wee haue no reaſon to ſtand in feare of. Wherefore if wee meane to arme our ſelues a-

gainst these passions, wee must haue recourse vnto Wisedome, and by her good meanes we shall soone come to know the nature of things: which being knowne, it will euidently appeare, that there is nothing which ought to bee so much feared and dreaded of vs. For take but away the maske of opinion, and wee shall finde their natures altogether pure, friendly, and agreeable vnto vs. Moreouer, we must accustome our selues a long time before to the terriblest and fearfullest things that are, and let vs set before our eyes the most gastly dangers which can fall vpó vs, and with ioy of heart sometimes commit our selues vnto the most dangerous hazards, for triall of our courages. To preuent a mans euill fortunes by running as

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it were to meete them, is to take Fortunes weapons into our hands and wound our ſelues with them. Were it not better for vs to bee prouided before hand to withſtād her force when ſhe aſſaulteth vs, then vpon the ſudden to be put to our ſhifts to defend our ſelues? For if we doe ſo, wee ſhall be ſure to haue leiſure to put on our weapons, to take our aduantages, and foreſee a place where to retire if neede be: where on the contrarie ſide, if ſhe ſet on vs vpon the ſudden, ſhe may eaſily ſurpriſe vs, and deale with vs as ſhe liſt. And therfore it ſhall be good for vs before the aſſault, to try how we can defende our ſelues, to make many falſe alarmes, & propoſe vnto our ſelues the dangers which worthie men haue ſuffered in our remembrances:

brances: how ſome haue eſcaped the greateſt, becauſe they would not bee daunted: and others haue been ouercome by the leaſt, becauſe they were not wel reſolued. But aboue all other things let vs ſo handle the matter, that wee doe not at any time apprehend death, or the feare thereof when it commeth: for it is a common obiect which troubleth our minde, and deſtroyeth our iudgements, and maketh vs abandon al offices and duties, and finally it cauſeth vs to forget our ſelues.

O that we could be once fullie perſwaded in this poynt not to feare death, good God how happie ſhould we then be? For in this one thing more then in any other, opinion taketh occaſion to band her ſelfe againſt reaſon, that ſo ſhe might

might terrifie vs by wearing the vgly vizard of death. And albeit there bee but one death in all the world, yet ſhe painteth him foorth vnto vs after an infinite kinde of faſhions. Beleeue me there is nothing in death which is to be feared: but here is the miſchiefe, ſhe ſendeth foorth certaine fearefull and cowardly ſpies abroad, to ſpie what is done, which report not the trueth what they haue ſeene, but what they haue heard mẽ ſay, and which they themſelues feare is likely for to happen. Indeed we truſt too much vnto the ſayings of the vulgar ſort of people, which are moſt inconſiderate, affirming it to be a great euill, and yeeld no credite vnto Philoſophie, which teacheth vs that it is the hauen of mans life. If *Socrates* be to be beleeued,

leeued, death is not to be feared. If *Cato* haue any credit with vs, he will perswade vs to runne and meete her comming vnto vs: and so will *Arria* the wife of *Petus*, which dyed to keepe her husband companie, for feare of sundring their loues which were sodered together by chast and holie wedlocke. After she had opened her breast with the first wound, and made a broad passage for death to come in at, she sayd vnto *Petus*; O *Petus*, death is not grieuous vnto me. She sayd this vnto him which well vnderstood that death was not euill, but the end of all euils to that man which was seased with her. For how should she bee euill being naturall? or irkesome and grieuous being so ordinarie and common?

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The contempt of death is the true and liuely ſource of all noble and commendable actions. From hence were deriued ſo many notable and excellent words of vertue, which vttered her ſentences by the mouthes of ſo many valiãt men of the world. This is the ſpirit which animated *Demetrius*, and put that worthie anſwere into his mouth which he made vnto *Nero*. *Nero* menaced him in this wiſe: Sirrha, I will cauſe you to be done to death. So will nature (quoth he) cauſe you to dye alſo ere it bee long. This is the ground of that inuincible reſolutiõ, which hardened & heartened *Heluidius Priſcus* againſt *Veſpaſian*: *Veſpaſian* ſent vnto him to will him not to come vnto the Senate. He returned him this anſwere: that it

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was in his power to strike him out of the number of Senatours, but as long as hee was a Senatour hee should not keepe him from that place, if he might doe withall. He sent him backe word againe, that he might repayre vnto the Senate-house, but withall charged him to say nothing whē he came thither. He told him hee would doe so, if no man asked his aduise. Nay that may not be, sayd he: for I must for mine honour sake aske your opinion as well as the rest. And I for my honour and credit (answered *Heluidius*) must needes speake what my conscience biddeth me. Well, if you doe, replyed *Nero*, looke not to liue one houre longer. Why, sayd hee, did I euer tell you that I was immortall? you may doe your pleasure, but I will

doe

doe my dutie. It may be it is your pleaſure to put mee to death wrongfully, then it will bee my part to dye conſtantly, and this is the ſhorteſt and longeſt of it. O wonderfull couragious and worthie ſentence, thriſe worthie to be heard and learned of them which are to ſtand in defence of iuſtice and reaſon, againſt violence and force! O true and liuely image of conſtancie, what a braue and notable example ſhalt thou be vnto all poſterities? Surely they which propoſe vnto themſelues the liues of ſuch noble perſonages to bee imitated of them, ſhall neuer haue their minds troubled with apprehenſion of any ill chance whatſoeuer: but with a couragious and vndaunted mindes they ſhall bee able to runne through fire and

flame

flame to purchase vertue and honour.

But as wee must shunne feare, so wee must take great heede that we doe not fall into choler, which is the other extremitie and flatlie opposed against it: for where as feare dooth make vs to retire and withdraw our selues wholly into our selues; on the other side choler carrieth vs cleane besides our selues, and seeking the meanes to repulse the euill which either a farre off threatneth vs, or presently seaseth vs, she maketh the bloud boyle in our hearts, and stirreth vp certaine furious vapours in our spirits which blind our eyes, and so throw vs down headlong vnto a speedie desire of reuenge, which greatly reioyceth our minds. That which most of al tickleth and delighteth

lighteth vs in this paſſion, is, that it ſeemeth to ariſe vppon a good ground, and may be iuſtly excuſed by the malice of other men. But what an excuſe is this? as if another mans *iniuſtice* could make the thing iuſt which is not iuſt of it ſelfe, or the loſſe which we receiue by another man could be deemed any way profitable vnto vs? Alas, ſhe wanteth that ſtrength which ſhe ſhould haue to doe vs good: ſhe is willing to cure one euill but by another. Briefly to commit the correction of offences vnto choler, were to correct one vice by an other. But reaſon which ſhould command in vs, will haue no ſuch officers which do al things of their owne heads, without ſtaying for any direction: ſhe deſireth to doe all things orderly and lawfully, as

well as nature. And becauſe it is not her propertie to vſe violence, therefore wee oftentimes thinke that where there is violence there is ſtrength. But alas wee deceiue our ſelues: for there is nothing ſo weake as an vnruly and diſordered motion. Now all violent motions proceede rather from weaknes then from ſtrength: and may bee well reſembled vnto the force of young children and old folkes, which runne when they thinke they doe but walke and goe about. For truſt me, anger and choler is but an argument of weakenes, and they are much deceiued that thinke otherwiſe. But what then, may ſome man ſay, ſhall vertue ſee vice waxe inſolent, and yet not bee mooued at all? ſhall wee take away all manner of libertie from

from them, ſo that they ſhall not haue ſo much leaue as to ſhewe foorth their anger againſt the wicked? For anſwere to this I ſay, that vertue deſireth no more libertie then it is fit and meete for her to haue; ſhee maye not turne her ſtrength againſt her ſelfe, or bee any thing mooued with another mans euill. For it is the propertie of a wiſe man as well to ſuffer the vices of euill men without choler, as to brooke their proſperities without enuie: and he muſt be as readie patiently to ſuffer the indiſcreete parts of many raſh headed perſons, as the Phiſition can bee content many times to beare many iniuries at his patients hands, being ſicke of a phrenſie.

Truly there is no greater wiſedome, nor more profitable in this

world, then patience in enduring the follie of other men. For otherwiſe it ſo falleth out diuers times, that becauſe wee cannot ſuffer their fooliſhnes, wee make it become ours, and ſo receiue much harme thereby. For firſt it makes vs loſe our iudgemēts, then it cauſeth vs to hurt our ſelues, till in the end we throw our ſelues headlong into that danger which we would willingly auoyd. This paſſion alſo may be very well and fitly likened vnto great walles or houſes when they fall, which breake and bruſe all that they light vpon: and ſhe is ſo earneſt in procuring another mans euill, that ſhe hath no reſpect at all vnto her owne good. Adde vnto all this that hath been ſpoken, that ſhe is very inconſiderate, and for the moſt part vniuſt:

and

and to ſpeake the trueth, offence and reuenge is but one ſinne, that hath diuers excuſes : for both of them haue one end, and that is to miſchiefe other men. Therefore let vs be diligent and careful, that wee doe not ſuffer any ſuch paſſions to ariſe in our minds : but as ſoone as any thing doth begin to moue vs any whit, or touch vs to the quicke, let vs pauſe and thinke vpon it a while : for if wee could but once find in our hearts to reaſon the caſe with our ſelues, wee ſhould be well able to ſtoppe the courſe of this cruell feuer of the minde. For looke but vpon the actions and geſtures of men when they are once in choler, marke how ill euery thing becommeth them. Contrarily, let vs recount with our ſelues the fruite of cle-

mencie and gentlenes, how it maketh vs ſeeme gratious and acceptable to others, and profitable or commodious vnto our ſelues. This is a loadſtone of power attractiue to draw mens hearts and goodwils vnto her.

Let vs therefore accuſtome our ſelues to forgiue all the whole worlde. Let not the greatnes or grieuouſnes of the iniurie withhold vs from pardoning them: but on the contrarie ſide let vs thinke, that the greater the iniurie is, the better it deſerueth to bee pardoned, and that the more iuſt our reuenge is, the more our gentlenes is to bee praiſed. But eſpeciallie ſuch as are ſeated by fortune in the higheſt degree of honour, ſhould take heede to their motions that they be remiſſe and temperate: for

as

for as their actions are of greater importance, ſo their faults are harder to bee cured. The heauen it ſelfe preſenteth them daily with an example and doctrine of auoyding all manner of haſte and precipitation, in ſhewing them that *Saturne* the very higheſt of all the Planets, is moſt remiſſe and ſloweſt in his courſe. And Aſtronomers ſay, that *Iupiter* alone by himſelfe is able to ſhoote foorth profitable and pleaſing lightnings and good abodes: but when there is a queſtion of ſending foorth hurtfull and reuenging ſtormes and lightnings, then he cannot do this of his owne authoritie, but is to craue the counſel and aſſiſtance of twelue other gods. And is it not a very ſtrange caſe, that he that is the greateſt of all the gods, that

can doe good vnto all the whole world, is not able to hurt one person, but after a solemne counsel & deliberation? so that *Iupiter* himselfe, though that he bee very wise, yet is hee afraid least he should ouershoote himselfe in a matter of reuenge, and therefore thinketh he had neede of good counsell to aduise him. Wherefore if at any time we happen to haue feeling of this passiō within vs, let vs repayre vnto our friends, & ripen our cholers with their pleasant discourses. For take the best man that is in the world when he is moued, & you shall see whether he be able to doe any thing as he ought to doe. For reason being hindered with passions, stands a man in as much stead, as wings doe birds when they are caught with lime-twigs

faſt by the feete. And this is the reaſon why wee ſhould ſtudie to lift vp our hearts from the earth, and place thē in a quiet and peaceable eſtate, if wee deſire to make our ſoules capable of al good and vertuous actions. We muſt neuer leaue till wee haue brought our minds to be of ſuch a diſpoſition, as the higheſt region of the ayre is, which is neuer darkened with clowdes, nor ſhaked with thunderbolts, but enioyeth a continuall fairenes: for ſo the mind ſhuld neuer bee darkened with ſorrow, nor mooued with choler. And if once a man could bring his mind vnto this paſſe, he ſhould very eaſily rule his other actions, & bring them vnto their wiſhed end: for then doubtles hee would followe nature hard by the heeles, tread altogether

altogether in her steps, and ioyne himselfe by a pleasant and temperate affection vnto those other parts of the world, of which man is the knot, the marriage knot which linketh heauenly & earthly things together.

The effects of this soft and temperate affectiō which mā beareth towards other things of ỹ world, are called duties, as if they did shew vs our dueties & behauiours towards other things. Therefore if we would learne to rule and moderate this dutie, and to bee informed in the right vse thereof, wee cannot haue a better mistresse then Nature to teach and informe vs. For she hath established an order and disposition in euerie thing, by vertue wherof she committeth things one vnder another,

and

and yet chaineth them altogether with the linkes of mutuall reſpect which they owe one to another, which ſhe hath engrauen in the forehead of each thing, as Princes ſtamp their images in their coine, to ſhew that they are good and lawfull money. Let vs therefore in euery thing cõſider the order and courſe of nature, and wee ſhall ſtraightwaies know the value of it, whether it bee currant or no, and how much will be giuen for it. Good being the obiect of mans will, where perfect and true good is to be foũd, there our will ought to be moued.

This being graunted, it muſt needes follow that the ſtrongeſt and chiefeſt affection of man, ought to be accounted that which ioyneth vs together with the au-

thor

thor and fountaine of all good, to wit, godlines: for by it a man is reunited and substantiallie ingrafted in his first cause, as being the roote which keepeth him (as long as hee abideth and dwelleth in it) in his full perfection: but contrarily, being separated from it, withereth and drieth away incontinently. Now the principall effect of pietie is to teach vs how to know God: for the honour and respect which we beare vnto any thing, proceedeth from the true knowledge of it. Therefore first of all wee must beleeue that there is a God: secondly, that hee hath created the worlde by his mightie power, bountie & wisedome, and by them gouerneth it: then, that his prouidence watcheth ouer al things, yea the smallest

things

things in the world. Againe, that whatſoeuer he ſendeth vnto vs, is for our good, and that our euill commeth not but from our ſelues. For if wee eſteeme thoſe chaunces euill which God ſendeth vnto vs, we ſhall oftentimes take occaſion to blaſpheme him; becauſe that naturally wee honour them which ſeeke our good, and hate them which procure vs any euill. And therefore wee muſt reſolue with our ſelues to bee obedient vnto him, and take in good part whatſoeuer commeth from his hands. And ſeeing that his knowledge is moſt perfect, his power thriſe infinit, and his will moſt louing and charitable: what reſteth then, but that we ſhould cõclude that God ſendeth nothing vnto vs, but tendeth to our great good? And albeit

beit we for our parts cannot conceiue the good which wee ought to receiue of that which hee sendeth vs; yet neuertheleſſe we hope all is for the beſt: ſuppoſing, that as the Phiſition doth oftentimes many things for the ſafetie of the bodie, which may ſeeme at the beginning to hurt it: ſo God in the guiding of our liues doth ſaue vs by means, which may ſeeme grieuous and hurtfull.

The Phiſition diuers times pricketh the eye to recouer a mans ſight: and oftentimes GOD almightie vſeth to pricke & wound our hearts with ſharpe afflictions, to reſtore our mindes vnto their brightnes. Vnder the ſeale of this aſſurance wee ought to commit and ſubmit our ſelues vnto him, confeſſing that we come into the world

world not to command, but to obey, finding lawes alreadie made which wee ought to follow. And therefore continually we ought to haue in mind (as a profitable lesson of our wise obedience vnto Gods ordinance) these noble verses of *Cleanthes*:

My God direct and guide my feete
in thy most knowen way:
For willingly Ile follow thee
forthwith, without delay.
For feare left bound in fetters strong,
I be not there held fast,
Where gainst my will, being once fast bound,
I cannot come in hast.
But as a man that honest is,
I may thereto attaine,
Whereto the fates and destinies,
my state of life ordaine.

And so for the rest, let vs neuer addresse our prayers and petitions vnto him, but to obtaine that at his hands which he hath purposely ordained

ordained for vs. For to aske any thing at Gods hands against his prouidence, were as much as in vs lieth to corrupt the Iudge and gouernour of the world. The best praier that we can make vnto him both for his honour and our profit, is, that he would vouchsafe to preserue our affections pure and holie, and to rule and gouerne our will, that it may alwaies be directed towards the attaining of that which is good.

The sacrifice which he requireth at our hands, is nothing els but an innocent life: he desireth not our goods, onely his wil and desire is, that wee should make our selues worthie of his: for there is not so small an offering but pleaseth him well, if it bee presented vnto him with chast and innocent hands.

Againe,

Againe, there is no ſacrifice bee it neuer ſo rich and coſtly, but diſpleaſeth him as much, if it come from polluted and defiled hands. *Apollo* being vpon a time demanded how he liked the ſacrifice of an hundred oxen which was offered vp vnto him, gaue this anſwer:

Hermions cake which he to me
in earthen veſſell gaue,
Pleaſde me full well, and for the ſame
he had what he did craue.

As if he ſhould haue ſayd in other words; A vertuous and wiſe man is the onely true prieſt of the great God, his ſpirit is his temple, wherein he offereth vp daily ſacrifices, his ſoule is his image, his affections are his offerings, and the greateſt and ſolemneſt ſacrifice which you can offer vnto him, is a true & vertuous imitation of him.

I ſay not this, as if the vſuall ceremonies in each countrie were not to be obſerued, ſo that there be an honeſt moderation of them without exceſſe or couetouſneſſe, but becauſe I am of opinion that God will be ſerued in ſpirit. And therefore to conclude this poynt, this is that I ſay, ẏ the beſt mãner of ſeruing & worſhipping him is, after we haue aſcribed all praiſe & glory vnto him, and decked him with all manner of titles which mans ſpirit can imagine, to hold this for a moſt conſtant reſolution, and confeſſe it publikely, that we haue preſented nothing vnto him worthie of his diuine Maieſtie; the fault being not in his Godhead, but in our impotencie and weaknes, which can neuer cõceiue ſo highly of him as he is.

From

From this worship and honour which is due vnto God, proceedeth this opinion which we ought to haue of him: that he is alwaies present to view and marke all our actions, whether it bee that wee come and present our selues before him, or els conuerse with mē. And therefore wee must so speake vnto God, as if men heard vs, and so liue amongst mē as if God saw vs. But aboue all other things, we must bee very religious in inuocating him for a witnes of the truth: for the due obseruation of an oth, is the principall part of godlines and pietie. For an oth is nothing els but an image of that vniuersall law which proceedeth from the goodnes of God, for contayning of all parts of the worlde in their place, and making them to be that

which they ought to be of right. It is a band which tyeth mens willes together, it is the gardian and tutor of constancie and trueth, the knot of ciuill societie, which closeth & shutteth vp all things most strongly with the name of God almightie, the chiefe president and ruler of all mens actions. And yet for al this, this is most certaine and true, that if a man can obtaine so much credit and fauour with mē, by liuing honestly and godly amōgst them, as that his word may be taken without any further ado, it were better not to vse any oth at all: but if it may not be otherwise, but for testimonie of the trueth we must needes sweare, we must looke that we vse to doe it as soberly and sparingly as we may. For the vse of any thing whatsoeuer,

uer, if it bee too vulgar and common, makes it to bee neglected and despised. And in any case look well to it, ỳ it be vsed to no other end but for assurance and confirmation of the truth; representing GOD before our eyes, sitting on high as protector of the faithfull, and sharpe punisher of periured persons.

Now from the honour due vnto God, the first cause of all, wee must descend as it were a step lower vnto that duty which we owe vnto the heauenly powers, ordayned by God, for administration and gouernmẽt of the world, and in them also wee must acknowledge a kind of excellencie & constancie of vertue in their perfectiõ, admiring the greatnes of their creator, and honouring their mi-

ministerie, imployed for preseruation and protection of vs men.

From thence let vs goe a little lower vnto the reuerence and respect which wee owe vnto them, by whose means as through pipes and conduits chosen by God, wee are deriued into this world. And in this place wee shall finde that our countrie may iustly challenge her prerogatiue, which vnder a fained and compound name, cõprehendeth an vnfained, true and naturall loue. For good cause wee owe of dutie more loue vnto our countrie, then vnto al other things contained in the world: because indeed it containeth infolden and wrapped within her safetie, the safetie and good of euery thing that wee doe loue and cherish: and contrariwise with her all the rest

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will ſoone periſh and be brought to nought. Out of the fountaine of this worthie affection, what a number of worthie and excellent deedes haue guſhed and ſtreamed foorth? of ſome that haue ſpent their liues for the good of their countrie: and other ſome which haue been content to forgoe their owne priuate iniuries, for feare leaſt if they ſhould haue ſought to haue reuenged them, they ſhould haue preiudiced the Common-wealth: of others that haue choſe to leade a miſerable and ſorrow-full life, to the end that they might procure their countries quiet reſt and happines. Still repreſent and lay before your eyes your countrie which hath brought you into this world, and here preſerueth you in ſafetie, ſuppoſe that ſhe is euer a

redemanding & asking of you the rights of pietie, and requiring the dutie and deuoir of a good & loyall citizen, and that she doth coniure you to seeke and couet after her good by the countrie of your natiuitie, by the lawes of your citie, by the faith of ciuill societie, by the safetie of your parents, children and friends, and lastly by your owne safetie and good. I beseech you therefore to haue more care of your countrie, then of all the world besides, and neuer preferre your particular profit before the good thereof: seeke not to auoyd the euill which is falling vpon you by turning it vpon her head.

Now your countrie being once serued in all dutifull sort, next after in order of respect follow our

parents

parents to be regarded. For God hauing choſen them as the means whereby he vſeth to diſpenſe and impart life vnto vs, as hee hath in ſome ſort made them partakers of his vertue, ſo is hee willing to communicate vnto them ſome part of his honour. If God hath granted vs wiſe and vertuous parents, wee ought to eſteeme them as gods vpon earth, giuen vnto vs not onely as meanes whereby we may liue, but liue a happie life, by their wiſe and vertuous educatiō. If they be wicked and euill yet ſtil wee muſt remember that they are our parents, & therefore with patience endure their authority ouer vs: and for the very names ſake of father and mother, yeeld them helpe and ſuccour of euery thing which we receiue of them: that is

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to say, of our goods, persons and liues. And if we doe so, wee shew that wee beare homage vnto nature, and yeeld condigne thankes vnto her for all her benefits.

From our parents let vs enter into consideration of our children, whom though wee doe not reuerence with like affection, yet haue we like care or rather a greater regarde of their welfare. For seeing that God hath placed and put vs in this world to garde and keep it, it seemeth that before we goe out of the worlde, wee are bound and obliged to subrogate and substitute others in our places to minister and serue the soueraigne power in this common temple. The bringing foorth of children is ours but in part, there bee many thinges herein which

contribute with vs, but the bringing vp and institution of them is altogether in our hands, which wee must owe of dutie, first vnto God to whom wee must present and offer them: secondly to our countrie, for whose seruice they are borne: and lastly to our selues, which are to looke for at their hands (if they bee well and vertuously brought vp) for al manner of help & succour in our old age. Therfore for these and the like respects, we ought to be most vigilant and carefull ouer them, and to procure as farre as in vs lieth their good.

Now after our children follow our wiues, who being vnited vnto vs by the law, and entring into societie and fellowship with vs, vnder the deare pledge of children

dren which they bring vs, haue a reasonable great part in our affections. The sharpe sawce of our life is sweetened by the sugar of their friendships, by their care the care of our business is abated, nay wee may safely rest our selues vnder their labours and industrie: let vs therfore haue such a respective care ouer them, as they haue ouer vs; let vs think and dreame vpon nothing but vpon their rest and quietnes, as being the moytie and the other halfe of our selues. But especially let vs make it knowne vnto them, that we do not honor them for any pleasure which their youth or beauties may affoord vs; as well for feare least if we doe so, wee happen to puffe vp their courages, and make them take more state vpon them then needeth:

deth: as also in this respect, that whereas this affection is founded and grounded vpon such a slipperie and running thing, it is to bee feared least the heate thereof bee soone quenched: but let vs respect and worship them for the faith and loyaltie which we looke for at their hands, for their good qualities and modest behauiours: and last of all, for the especial care which they haue of their children, which are common betweene vs and them. And the better to prouoke and stirre them vp to loue and cherish vs, let vs shew that we wil not appropriate any thing from them vnto our selues, but make them equally partakers of our goods, thoughts & affections. For this communitie of all things maye greatly serue to nourish good

good will and amitie betweene vs, which is cleane lost and abolished in the diuersitie of willes and determinations.

This affection passeth from our wiues vnto their kinsfolke, which are allied vnto vs by nature, their running together with their bloud, a secret inclination of good will and affection towards all them which are sprung from the same branch, and accordingly as they are neerer vnto vs in bloud, so are wee more liuely affected towards them, & bound to performe and yeeld vnto them neerer duties and seruices. Therefore herein as well as in all other matters to obserue the order of nature, as being the soueraigne ornament of all creatures, let vs (as I haue sayd before) so dispense the loue and affection

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which wee owe vnto our parents, as they doe neerer concerne and regard vs, yeelding them all manner of helpe and ſuccour which can poſſibly be deuiſed.

Hetherto nature hath as it were with her owne hand moued our affections: now wee muſt of neceſſitie come to ſpeake of the motions and inclinations which vertue giueth, which bindeth vs to loue and honour vertuous & wiſe men. And truely of all the goods which we enioy by the benefit of common ſocietie, there is no one that ought to bee more eſteemed and cheriſhed, then the friendſhip and amitie of honeſt men: for it is the very piller and vpholder of our happines: it is ſhe that gouernes our liues, ſweetneth our ſowre, and ſeaſoneth our ſweete: ſhe giueth

ueth vs in prosperitie one vpon whom wee may bestow part of our goods and enioy the comforts of our prosperitie, who in time of affliction wil be readie to succour and comfort vs, one that can teach and instruct vs in our youth, helpe and relieue vs when we bee olde, assist and second vs in our middle ages. And as the possession hereof is pretious, so we ought to employ our wisedoms to haue this friendship as perfect as may be. And to this ende and purpose wee must hunt and seeke after men of the greatest merits, honouring and cherishing them as if they were sent from God to ioyne with vs in a societie of certaine noble and worthie actions. Wee must seeke to purchase it by honest occasiõs: and hauing once gotten it, studie

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to preſerue it by a due performãce of all duties. For all creatures, and principally men, are borne with a kinde of inclination of loue towards that which may any waies profit or auaile them. And yet for al this, a vertuous man doth neuer meaſure his profite by the ell of goods (as we call them) or riches: but by the commoditie which hee receiueth & reapeth by his friends in the ſtudie of vertue. And if it ſo fall out that there be any commoditie, bee it neuer ſo ſmall, to bee parted betweene vs & our friends, touching our goods and honours, or ſuch like things, it ſhall bee our parts to giue place vnto them: for all this cannot be better imployed then in purchaſing of true friends. On the contrary ſide, there is but one onely reaſon which may ex-

cuse vs from leauing their friendship and amitie, and that is when they abandon reason and philosophie, which ioyneth and combineth vs together. And yet this must be done very warily: for we may not be at plaine enmitie with them for all this. We must rather vnrip then rent their friendships from vs, and seeke out all reasonable meanes (if it be possible) to bring them backe againe vnto their duties, without blaming their actions, or checking their opiniõs: neuer fighting with them, vnles it be by way of disputation and discourse, which are the sacred weapons of true friẽdship: but though we lose al hope of preuailing with them this way, yet wee may not become their open and professed enemies. For though a good man

leaue

leaue his friends when they leaue off to bee vertuous: yet notwithstanding so it is, that in forsaking that friendshippe and familiaritie which hath been in former time betweene them, he retaineth that common affection which ought to bee amongst men, which bindeth them to wish wel vnto those which haue not well deserued at their hands: telling them that this is to imitate God, which as he loueth the good, so he doth not hate the bad. And therefore we haue a common saying, that a good man hath no enemies at all, because he hateth no bodie.

Thus you see the degrees of affection which are betweene man and the things which are without him. But because it commeth so to passe many times, that they doe

draw vs vnto diuers ends, and ſo hold vs ſuſpended in doubtfulnes and incertaintie, therfore we muſt eſtabliſh a rule vnto our ſelues of preferring the former duties before the latter. We ought to make great account of an oth, and yet it were better broken then kept, if by keeping of it we offend God. We muſt of force highly reuerẽce our fathers and mothers: and yet if their wils doe contradict right reaſon, which is appoynted by God himſelfe to gouerne vs, wee muſt rather forſake them, then forſake God and reaſon. Our kinſfolkes are to bee eſteemed deare vnto vs, but yet if they ſeeke to annoy and moleſt father or mother, we may lawfully diſſent from thẽ. Friends may preuaile much with a man, his wife and childrẽ much more:

more: and yet for all this, there are certaine particular and priuate duties which are rather to be performed to them which are further off from vs, then to them which be neerer: but commonly it is in a matter of no great waight when ciuill ſocietie (becauſe of the common neceſſitie of men) incrocheth and vſurpeth ſomewhat vpon nature. As when wee ſay we ſhould helpe our neighbour in fetching in of his harueſt, and not our kinſman, and in ſuch like caſes.

I haue hetherto, as you ſee, repreſented vnto you the reſpect which man oweth vnto thinges which are without him: it is now high time to cauſe him to deſcend into himſelfe, and bring backe his affections vnto his owne proper perſon, as lines are reduced vnto

their center. A wise man without doubt yeeldeth much respect vnto himselfe: and though no body regard him but his owne conscience, yet hee will bee very carefull that he doe neither speake nor doe any thing which is not fit and cō. uenient. For right ordered reason, which ought to gouerne all his actions, is vnto him the seuerest iudge and censor of his actions that can be found. And therefore wee must studie as well publikely as priuatly so to frame and fashiō our actions in such sort, that wee may not haue occasion to blush and be ashamed of them: & that nature which ought to be the rule of all our actions, be not violated in any sort. Now it hath pleased nature to giue vs a bodie, as a necessarie instrument for the preser-

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uation of mans life. Therefore we must take care for the bodie, but no otherwise then we would doe for a thing which is vnder the protection of the minde, which must bee carefull for the safetie thereof, but no waies seruiceable vnto it: he must entreate it so as if he were a Lord and no tyrant ouer the bodie, still nourishing it without engrossing or fatting it: so that it may euidently appeare vnto all men that hee doth not liue for it, but that hee cannot liue without it.

A cunning workman is not a little forward in his busines, when he hath gotten all his tooles about him in a readines: and so hee that loueth philosophy doth not a little thing profit himselfe, if he doe but once know how to serue himselfe

with his bodie, and make it a fit inſtrumēt for him to exerciſe vertue. Now the bodie may be preſerued in health two manner of waies: the one is by moderation in his diet: the other, by good order in his exerciſe. For why the nature of things here beneath is ſo ſlipperie and vncertaine, that vnleſſe a man doe continually repayre that which time doth waſte and conſume, things will by little and little come in the ende to nought. Therefore wee muſt ſuſtaine and helpe the bodie once decaying by vſe of meates; but with this prouiſo or caueat, that wee doe not make it, by making too great cheare, heauie, dull, and vnfit for contemplation: nor by too ſpare diet and ill entreatance, weake and ſickly: ſo that it bee neither

neither effeminated with riot, nor by neglect of it accuſtome it ſelfe to filth and beaſtlines.

After meate followeth exerciſe, although they ſeeme to bee confounded and to follow one an other indifferently. For firſt wee exerciſe our ſelues, and then wee take our repaſt: and after meate then we fall a freſh to exerciſe: the firſt exerciſe ſerues to prepare vs to the better appetite and receiuing our meates: the ſecond, to waken nature, and keepe the parts of the bodie in continuall motion. We muſt vſe our exerciſes ſo, that the bodie may bee the better for them, and our minde nothing the worſe: but we muſt not ſeek ſuch exerciſes as wraſtlers vſe, and ſuch like, which doe all things by compaſſe and meaſure, and many obſeruations,

ſeruations, which ſerue indeede to keepe the bodie vpright & ſtrong, & to no other vſe: but therby they weaken the ſtrength of the ſoule, and take away from her her true and naturall motions. It is an abſurditie for a wiſe man to be carefull for to find out fit exerciſes for the bodie, ſeeing that he may find euery where ſo many as are requiſite and needfull for the health thereof.

After the bodie is once nouriſhed and exerciſed in ſuch ſort as I haue ſhewed you, it is moſt eaſily faſhioned and framed vnto modeſt & ſeemely actions, which we ſhould ſo much regard and labour to attaine vnto, that in our very countenances and gate ſhuld appeare a great tranquilitie of mind, mixed with a ſober & pleaſant

ſant kinde of grauitie. I doe not ſpeake this as if I would haue you to vſe anie affectation in your countenance and geſtures, as to looke with the flatterers ſmile, or the Philoſophers frowne. For as a ſober grauitie maketh a man to be reuerenced of all: ſo a kinde of portlike and conſtrained auſteritie, makes him to appeare ridiculous and odious vnto all.

But becauſe it is ſpeech which giueth life vnto our countenances and dead geſtures, therefore wee muſt take great heede that we be able to rule and gouerne it. And ſurely the beſt precept which wee can giue any man in this caſe, is ſilence. For to know how to be ſilent with reaſon is a great aduantage, if a man mark it, to him that meanes to ſpeake well: for it is not

poſſible

poſſible for a man to ſpeake well, & to ſpeake much, one mā cannot doe both. Silence is the father of diſcourſe and fountaine of reaſon: contrarily in much talke there is much offence. They that ayme directly at anything, ſhut one of their eyes and winke with the other: and wherefore doe they ſo? but to ſtrengthen and entreaſe the vertue of their ſight. This teacheth vs ẏ the ſences being caſt abroad, doe by the very powring foorth of themſelues waxe feeble & weake: and euen ſo is it with the ſpirit, being caſt abroad by ſpeech, and ſcattered and difuſed into many wordes, it loſeth his force and vertue. But on the contrarie ſide, if it be reſtrained with ſilence, it gathereth his wonted ſtrength, and ſtores himſelfe with prudence and wiſe-

wiſedome. The vſe of words whē occaſion bids vs ſpeake, ought to bee this: to ayde the trueth, and to carrie the candle before her that ſhe may be ſeene: & contrariwiſe to diſcouer and reiect lyes and vntruth: to praiſe that which is good, and blame that which is otherwiſe. We muſt not accōpanie our ſpeech with too great vehemēcie or contention, for this ſheweth our paſſions. Againe, we muſt not vſe to diſcourſe of matters that doe happen in common aſſemblies or Theaters, or to entertaine them that bee in our companie with ſuch or the like diſcourſes: for this ſheweth much leiſure and ſmall profit.

Furthermore, it is not conuenient to ſtand much vpon our actions, or to tell men what we haue done,

done, & what hath chanced vnto vs in our times: for there is much vanitie herein. Others peraduenture take not so much pleasure in hearing you talk, as you do in telling & recounting your owne vanities. To speake of other mẽs actions, without offence, is a very dangerous and hard matter: for either wee commend them without reason, or els blame thẽ without knowing their intention. But aboue all other things, let vs take heede of making songs of men, or laughing and gibing at them: for so doth euery common iester, and it makes vs lose our reputatiõ with good men. Besides, these iests are for the most part mixed with filthie and lewd wordes, which wee should shunne and auoyd. Now the libertie of speaking vnhoneſt

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and vnſeemely wordes, draweth after it the like effects. But wee muſt ſtriue (if it be poſſible) that our wordes may redound to the profit of them which ſhall heare vs, that they be ſtuffed with good and wholeſom precepts, that they ſerue to bring them back vnto the ſtudie of vertue which wander in the way of ſinne and wickednes. In our common diſcourſe wee muſt auoyd too profound and ſubtill queſtions. For a man may compare thē to creyfiſhes, which affoord a mā more picking worth then meate: the ende of them is nothing els but braules and contention: and moſt commonly it ſo fareth with them as it doth with men that haue weake ſtomackes, which vomit vp al that which they cannot well diſgeſt. As wee deſire

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to haue audience when we ſpeake our ſelues, ſo muſt we be attentiue to other mens ſpeeches, and heare them to the end without interruption. We muſt not accord and agree vnto all that is ſayd: for there bee ſome which will not ſticke to ſay any thing, and others that will contradict them as faſt: ſome be flatterers, others bee raſh and inconſiderate: but wee muſt yeeld our conſents to that which is euidently true, and peremptorily denie that which is euidently falſe, and in doubtfull thinges ſuſpend our iudgemēts, till we haue found ſome reaſon or ground to ſtand vpon.

Now becauſe a mans wordes and geſtures are framed by long cuſtome and imitation of others, we ſhould not ſort our ſelues too much

much with the common ſort of people, or haunt the Theaters and common places of aſſemblie, or haue often recourſe to feaſts and banquets: for in euery one of theſe places it is not poſſible but a man ſhould draw ſome vile humour or other from the common people. If it ſo happen that wee muſt needes bee there for our honours and credits ſakes, yet wee muſt alwaies haue our minds ſo ſtraight bound, that wee will not remit a iot of our courage and reſolution, that is, to gouerne our ſelues in like ſort as I haue ſhewed you before. And the better to ſtrengthen & fortifie our ſelues, let vs in each thing that we go about, lay before our eyes the examples of wiſe and graue men, and imagine with our ſelues what a *Socrates* or a *Zeno*

woulde haue done, if they had been in our places: and by and by you shall see their vertues will minister vnto vs an example of well doing. But the best lesson of all which Philosophie can teach vs to behaue our selues in all our actions, is carefully to set downe and examine with our selues the proceeding and ending of euerie busines which we doe take in hād, to measure our strengths and abilitie, & try whether it be not proportionable vnto our desseignements. He that taketh wise counsell before hand, shall soone arriue at his wished port: but hee that taketh no counsell, is like vnto him that flotes vp and downe in a riuer, hee doth not goe whither hee would goe, but is violently carried away against his intended course,

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and ſo committing himſelfe vnto the mercie of the ſtouds, arriueth at length at the ſea: that is to ſay, a vaſt and turbulent kind of incertitude.

Therefore before we enterpriſe any matter, let vs wiſely foreſee what the end of it is likely for to be, then let vs cõſider what meanes we haue to atchieue it, and ſo wee ſhall bee able euen in thought to preuent all euill chances that are likely to encounter vs. Would you faine bee one of them which exerciſe themſelues at the games of Olympus? think then how much it behoueth you to beſtirre you, if you will doe it for your credits ſake, you muſt liue by rule and ſquare, diet your ſelfe to certaine meates, and certaine houres, accuſtome your ſelfe to heate and

cold, annoynt your bodie with oyle, then haue dust throwne ouer it, enter within the lists, be hurt, & it may be cleane vanquished and disgraced. After you haue wisely foreseene all this, consider the habitude and disposition of your bodie, whether it will brooke this kinde of exercise or no, and then vndertake it if you please. If you haue a desire to be of the Philosophers profession, represent & lay before your face the manifolde troubles which your poore soule must be contented to endure: as to be depriued of many pleasures and commodities, and with great patience to suffer all the world to gibe and iest at you. If your courage will serue you to endure all this and a great deale more, you may take this course of life vpon you:

you: but when you haue once vndertaken it, forgoe or forſlow it not at any hand, conſtantly perſeuer and follow your determination as a law inuiolable. For beſides this inconuenience which commeth by changing our purpoſes, that it maketh our mindes doubtfull and vncertaine, there is this harme in it, that it cauſeth vs to become ridiculous vnto others: where on the contrary ſide, conſtancie in the end makes vs to be admired of them which at the firſt laughed and ieſted at vs.

And becauſe I would not haue you be terrified with mens iudgements which they ſhall giue concerning your actions, let this be al your care and induſtrie, that your actions be ſuch as they ought to be. Doe not ſtudie to conceale or

hide them from them which say they doe not like them; if they be not good, it behoued you not then to haue done them; and if they be good, the better they shall bee knowne the more assurance shall you haue of them. I doe not speak this as if my meaning were that you should couet to bee seene in well doing, or call all the people about you to see your vertues, as they do which betake themselues vnto Images for sanctuarie. As the colour shineth and glistereth in the day time, yet seekes not the Sunne to come and gild it; onely stands readie prest to receiue the light thereof whē it shineth: euen so vertue ought not to seeke and hunt after glorie, but onely be readie disposed to entertaine and admit of it, as the testimonie of those

which

which iudge vnfainedly of her merits. He that loueth praiſe and oſtentation, forſakes reaſon to follow opinion: for hee ſetteth downe this as a maine rule vnto himſelfe, that he had rather pleaſe another man then himſelfe.

There is nothing which can help vs ſo much to make that ſort well which wee haue luckely vndertaken, as the taking of times and opportunities. For time carrieth with it certaine moments, which are the ſeaſons and opportunities of buſines. If you loſe them, or let them ſlip, you loſe all your labour and pains. But if occaſion be once taken with opportunitie, and followed with diligence, you ſhall ſeldome miſſe of your purpoſe, but haue alwaies good ſucceſſe in your affayres. And therefore

wee must looke that that which hath been maturely deliberated and thought vpon, be speedily put in execution: and let vs not accustome our selues to post that ouer to the morrow, which may be as well done the same day. But whē we doe any thing, though we doe it neuer so wisely, take all aduantages, chuse all opportunities, vse all possible diligence: yet for all this we must know that the greatest part of the euent is altogether ouer mastered by Fortune. Wee are lords and masters of our counsels and determinations, but al the rest dependeth vpō other matters which are not in our power. And therefore we can doe no more but vndertake a matter with wisedome, pursue it with hope, and be readie to suffer whatsoeuer shall happen

happen with patience. If good enterprises haue bad successe, the answere which the noble man of Persia made, may serue for an excuse to all them which are wise, but vnfortunat. One was desirous to know of him wherefore (seeing ỳ he knew him to bee a very wise & valiant gentleman) his affayres went no better forward. Because (quoth hee) in my affayres I can but giue good counsell, that is all I can doe, the successe belongeth altogether vnto Fortune or God that is Lord ouer her. Therefore it is sufficient for vs if wee doe all that belongeth vnto vs, that is, if wee attempt nothing but with a good end, and follow it not but by lawfull and honest meanes.

Thus at the length (to grow to an end) you haue heard discoursed vnto

vnto you the principall lawes which the Stoickes thinke expedient to vse for the better ordering and gouerning of mans life: but because lawes without iudgements are nothing worth, but like dead words, therefore if wee will make our profite and benefit of them, wee must euery day in the euening narrowly sift and examine our selues, to see whether our actions be conformable vnto the rules which haue been taught vs, smoothing that which is rugged, and closing vp all chinks and holes: and last of all, making that which is crooked right, by rectifying and righting it according vnto the rule of reason: but if we finde that all thinges sort as they should doe, and that euery thing is very conformable vnto these

holy

holy and ſacred lawes, we ſhall receiue a ſecret ioy into our hearts, which ſhall bee the pleaſant fruite which we ſhall reape of our innocent and vnſpotted liues. This ſhall be in my opinion the ſweeteſt and moſt melodious night ſong which we cã ſing vnto God: for I am verely perſwaded that he taketh not ſo much pleaſure and delight in any thing here in this lower world, as in ſeeing man his deareſt and coſtlieſt worke, keepe and maintaine his beautie & perfection wherein he was at the firſt created. But becauſe ſuch is the nature of things created, by reaſon of the naturall infirmitie and weakenes which they doe carrie about with them, that the good which God beſtoweth vpon vs as ſoone as we are borne, doth daily waſte

waste and consume away, vnlesse it bee continually repayred and supplied by the flowing streames of his bounty and liberality which runne continually: and whereas our naturall forces can neuer bee sufficient of themselues to keepe vs in this perfection, let vs adde vnto the former canticle an Epode or sacred song of enchantment, in inuocation of his diuine fauour; let vs (I say) continuallie all the daies of our life, at the very same houre close vp this present action with this prayer, saying: O almightie, all wise, and all mercifull God, which hast giuen vs an vnderstanding minde to know how to gouerne and direct the course of our liues; make vs to knowe and loue the excellencie wherewith thou hast adorned vs,

to

the end that when it ſhal come to moue the powers of our ſoules, it may find our members and ſences purged of all manner of paſſions, readie and prompt to follow and obey it. Take away from the eyes of our minds the troubleſome clowds & miſts which ignorance or couetouſnes doth caſt before them, to the end that our reaſon being cleered by the light of thy diuine trueth, we may alwaies addreſſe our ſelues vnto the ſearching and following after that which is the true and euerlaſting good, which ſhall continue for euer and euer.

FINIS.